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Abstract
The use of economic principles in computer science is a comparatively recent development.
The application of economic concepts such as marginal utility, preferences, efficiency, and
resource allocation have begun to be discussed at a theoretical level. Several systems
have been developed that attack problems of computer science using these principles.
The applications include use of idle resources in a network and approximating solutions
of complex problems by transforming the problem into a general equilibrium framework.
This thesis uses market mechanisms more directly and addresses the problem of allocating
processor time using a market in computation. This allows for efficient use of processor
time, and is especially useful ill the case where many more useful tasks could be performed
than time constraints may allow. The unique problems associated with a market for a
processor are discussed. A protocol is proposed to rent the processor at a rate per-time-
unIit, determined by market forces.
Thesis Supervisor: Jon Doyle
Title: Principal Research Scientist
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Chapter 1
Introduction
For many applications in computer science, the availability of processor time is a sig-
nificant limiting factor. It is normally desirable to perform tasks as quickly as possible
and to utilize approaches or algorithms that are most applicable and efficient. Trade-
offs among different methods and resources must also be considered. The final goal is a
rational allocation of computation time and other computational resources.
In this thesis, I explore the issue of allocating processor time by using a market-based
approach. Markets and the science of economics offer many possible advantages, which
are discussed in chapter 2.
The task of guiding automated reasoning presents an especially appropriate domain
for the market-lbased approach, and my trial implementations have centered on this
problem. In the following section I briefly introduce control of reasoning as a natural
case for an economic approach to allocation of computation time.
1.1 Control of Reasoning
It, is a principal goal of artificial intelligence to mechanize logical reasoning and rational
decision-making. For many approaches to this problem, it is useful to represent what
the agent believes about the wvorld in which decisions are being made. The reasoner
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maintains a set of beliefs from which to make inferences, draw conclusions, and decide
actions. All of these activities may result in new beliefs, and provide new information,
possibly contradictory, regarding old beliefs.
The task of guiding revision of the reasoner's beliefs is thus, in itself, an important
part of controlling reasoning based on beliefs. At a high level of abstraction, there are
two approaches to maintenance of the reasoner's bleliefs. The first is to insist that all
b)eliefs are consistent and all inferences sound. The principal advantage to this approach
is that there is never any doubt al)out justifications. All inferences, conclusions, and
dlecisions will ble provably valid, in the sense of mathematical logic. However, requiring
total coherence may prove intractable with large numbers of beliefs and frequent changes
to these beliefs.
Consider a person watching a football game. At one point she notices that Ronnie
Lott is wearing a Jet uniform, contradicting her belief that Lott plays for the Raiders.
To be certain that her beliefs are still sound and consistent after the introduction of
this new b)elief, an extremely complicated search of a massive database (her brain) must
take place, propagating this update. Intuitively, this seems to be a large waste of time,
especially considering what a small portion of the brain is devote(l to b)eliefs concerning
football. This intuition motivates a secon(l approach to maintaining l)eliefs.
The guiding principle of this second methlod is the rational use of time and other
resources in maintaining beliefs. Rationality in this context refers to the economic def-
inition, namely the optimum use of scarce resources under (possibly) incomplete in-
formation. Manv models in artificial intelligence use this principle implicitly by using
algorithms designed to avoid unnecessary calculation. This is often called "efficiency" by
computer scientists, where efficient in this case is usually translated to fast (relative to
the next fastest method). Economists have established a wealth of research concerning
a more general notion of efficiency resulting from equilibria.
In this research, the principles of economic rationality and efficiency are employed
more directly. An efficient allocation of resources (in particular computation time) is
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acl-lieved by using a market economy as the underlying computational model. Processes
act as agents in a free market, competing for the use of limited resources. In light of the
recent downfall of totalitarian communism, it seems ironic that the computation model
in which each process is explicitly instructed what to do when has received virtually all
of the attention of computer scientists.
In fact, free markets and decentralized decision-making offer most of the same ad-
vantages in computation that they (do in the blusiness economy. Of great importance are
tremendously increased sensitivity to world dynamics, especially locally, and the al)ility
to control processes much more efficiently through specialization of metho(ls and infor-
rmation. (For a detailed discussion of the advantages of decentralized decision-mnaking, see
[21.) Perhaps most importantly, markets can l)e dlesignedl to provide maximally efficient
allocation of resources, of critical significance for automated reasoning and many other
applications in computer science.
1.2 Guide to the Thesis
The principal contributions of this thesis are a definition of economically efficient use of
time, and( description of a market mechanism that ensures such an allocation. To glean
the most significant discoveries, the rea(ler need only rea(l chapter 4 and section 5.5.2
However, I have also provided motivation for my approach, and discussed many alterna-
tives, issues, and open problems. The thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 provides an abstract justification for the use of economic principles in
computer science. Readers not familiar with tile merits of this approach may find the
rest of the thesis confusing if they have not read this chapter.
Chapter 3 outlines important contributions of previous research that relates economic
principles to computer science. No material in this chapter is a prerequisite for other
chapters.
Chapter 4 (lescril)es the goals of processor allocation and defines much of the termi-
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nology used. It outlines why a processor market is non-trivial, and provides a few general
classes of applications. Chapter 4 provides much of the groundwork for the remainder of
the thesis.
Chapter 5 critiques a variety of possible models for a market in processor time, in-
cluding the successful processor rental model discussed in section 5.5.2.
Chapter 6 descril)es the computational market that I have implemented as part of
the RECON reasoning economy. These details are likely only significant to the reader
vwho inten(ls to bluild a market-based computation system.
Chapter 7 looks at many of the probllems to which my research has opened a door.
It discusses the limitations of computational markets, and discusses many issues that
are not completely solved by my research. It further addresses potential difficulties in
practical implementations and scaling of computational economies to larger systems. It
also includes two possible extensions of the processor market mechanism to a memory
market andl to a multi-processor market. Readers interested in opportunities for further
research in related areas will certainly want to read this chapter.
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Chapter 2
The Role of Economics in
Computer Science
The use of economics in computer science is not a completely new idea. Economic prin-
ciples such as rationality and efficiency have been used implicitly in artificial intelligence
for many years. Only recently, however, has the science of economics been used directly
as a guide for research in computer science. The systems and research described in chap-
ter 3 serve as an empirical justification for the use of economics in computer science. In
this chapter, I provide a more theoretical justification, and describe some of the potential
benefits offered to computer science by economics.
Because a large body of work already exists in economic theory and analysis of real-
woril economies, the possibility exists that a great deal can be learned from this science
if it proves applicable. In addition, economics provides well-established and well-defined
termiinology which may help to provide standardization for similar notions in computer
science.
This chapter provides only the highlights to serve as goals and general justification
for applying the economic methodology. For additional details of the possible advantages
of economics see [22, 21, 10, 30, 2].
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2.1 Resource Allocation
One of the principal topics in economics is the allocation of resources. Substantial re-
search has been conducted )both in how resources are allocated in human society, and
how they shoul(l be allocated. Specifically, economists are interested in allocating scarce
resources. A resource is scarce if the demanll for the resource exceeds the supply when
the cost is zero. This will be the case for most resources that are considered "desirable."
Examples of scarce resources include virtually all of the products that we buy from day
to (lay. One example of a resource that is usually not scarce is air, since, under nor-
mal circumstances, air is free and the supply exceeds the (leman(d. In a computer, most
resources will be scarce, since if there were no cost whatsoever (including opportunity
costs from not doing something else), processor time, memory space, an(l disk space will
b)e in greater d(emand than their supply. In general, this cannot be corrected by simply
increasing the supply to a new fixed value. Countless computer programmers who once
claimed they would never need more than 256k are now pushing the limits of their 16
Meglabyte machines.
Economists have establishe( a well-tried solution to the scarce resource allocation
prob)lem, namely the use of markets. A great volume of research shows that markets can
achieve optimal allocations under many circumstances with little or no central guidance.
Each market participant need only think of itself', and the equilibrium allocation will
very often be optimal (in the sense that it could not be improved upon by an omniscient
resource allocator), or very close to optimal. Markets also have significant advantages
over central allocation schemes, some of which are mentioned in the following sections.
In light of this research, it seems only natural to use market mechanisms to allocate
resources in a computer.
1I use the neuter form for participants so as include organizations, individuals, and computational
entities.
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2.2 Efficiency
Economic theory also provides a definition of efficiency that is in some cases more precise
or more useful than its common meaning in computer science. Computer scientists
usually use the term "efficient" to mean fast compared to other possible methods. This
is the standard meaning of an efficient algorithm in computer science. Because efficient
is defined relative to other options, it often has an imprecise meaning since there may
exist faster options that are unknown.
Economists generalize the meaning of efficiency to include not only speed (the "effi-
cient" use of time), but efficient use of all other resources as well. Economic efficiency is
concerned with the tra(leoffs that exist between resources, the competition for their use,
anld( conditions which imply that all resources are simultaneously being used for maximal
benefit. One important criterion for efficiency is the Pareto optimality condition. An
allocation is Pareto optimal if any possible trade would make at least one agent worse off.
Intuitively, this condition means that all agents involved are maximizing their belnefit.
This generalized notion of efficiency can be extende(l to discuss "rational" allocations
alnl "rational" decision making. The Pareto optimality condition specifies that given
the preferences of the agents involved, the allocation cannot be improved upon in every
aspect. Thus all Pareto optimal points can be considered "rational" since deviations
cannot result in strictly superior "solutions."
2.3 Decentralized Decision Making
Market systems are based on (lecentralized decision making. Each participant needs only
local information with which to make decisions concerning preferences and eventually
valuations of goods and services. It many cases it may be much easier to formulate
solutions to local decisions than to global ones. It is also very likely that there may be
too much information for a central decision maker to process in any reasonable amount
of tine.
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In any situation in which there is a tremendous amount of total information and/or
a very high rate of incoming information, it may e impractical or impossible to make
sensible decisions centrally. In the case of uncertain or conflicting information, decen-
tralized participants may have a much better chance to make a reasonable choice, since
they will presumnal)ly have less uncertainty and fewer contradictions to deal with. Since
many applications of artificial intelligence deal with large amounts of information, which
may be uncertain or conflicting, this advantage may carry over into computer science.
Decentralization may also allow for specialization to local problems. Indivi(luals in
the same ':business" may develop more efficient means of communicating and exchanging
knowledge that are specific to their business. A central decision maker woul(l have to
know all of these "languages" in order to process the available information.
Of course, this should not l)e viewed as a guaranteed route to success. In many cases,
central planners will be able to operate more quickly than decentralized planners and still
make good decisions. This will especially be the case when the solutions to the problemns
at hand are well known and the system is serving more as a command hierarchy than a
decision maker. For example a computer that is asked to evaluate 2 * (4 + 7 - /* 9),
prol:ablyl doesn't want to spend any effort determining what to (lo first.. A fast method
for doing this evaluation is already known.
For a more thorough discussion of the possible advantages of decentralized decision
making, see [2].
2.4 Dynamic Adjustment
One of tile greatest strengths of well designed markets is their ability to adjust very
rapidly to sudden, unforeseeable changes. Each participant need only adjust its own val-
uations based on the changes, and the equilibrium will reflect the new optimal allocation
of resources. No authority is needed to determine a new solution - the market provides
t.hat automatically.
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This is a significant advantage in a computer system, especially in artificial intelligence
or in control systems. The environment is constantly changing and in general it will be
impossible to predict what will happen in the future. Rapid adjustment to these changes
is highly desirable.
One unfortunate side effect is that markets are very often chaotic systems in the sense
that very slight variations in parameters may result in very large changes in the future
course of the market. Dynamic adjustment often demand(s this property, but it can make
it very difficult to analyze the behavior of a sstemn or predict how it will act in the
future.
2.5 Sensitivity to Demand
Markets have a remarkable ability to produce those things that are (lemandled, even if
they are not what a central analyst would have guessed. This may allow a computer
system l)ase(l on markets to make surprising decisions and( appear to "invent" solutions
simply b)ecause the demands of the participants have evolved over time.
.An interesting real-world example of this behavior, which unfortunately will (late this
thesis, is the production of Carolina Panther hats in 1993, even though the Carolina
Panthers will play their first National Football League game in 1995. It seems unlikely
that. a central planner could have anticipated such a strong deman(l for these hats at this
time. But the market mechanism met the delemanl almost immediately.
O)n the other si(le, an often cited probllem with the former Soviet comnmand economy
was that production was based on predetermined( goals, and did not necessarily meet any,
demand. In one case, this meant that a factory produced literally tons of nails that were
all exactly the same, even though users of nails really needed much more specialization.
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2.6 The Success of Real-World Markets
F'inlally, it makes some sense to look at market dlecision-making systems and central com-
man(l systems in the real world. Although it is impossil)le to separate other influencing
factors with certainty, it seems that relatively unregulated market systems like those
found in the United States and South Korea have drastically outperformed command
economies such as the former Soviet Union and North Korea.
()ptimistically, it may be possible to achieve similar outperformance of central com-
mand systems in a computer.
2.7 Tradeoffs
()f course, using economics in computer science is not without its tradeoffs. Several pos-
sible problems have been mentioned earlier, including chaos (mathematically speaking)
an(l overthinking of simple problems. In a computer system, markets may also be dif-
ficult to structure, and the constraints on programming methods may be sigInificaIlt. It
may also be very lifficult to determine the preferences (and thus utility functions) of
participants, an(l it is very unlikely that any particular set of preferences can be justified
on a theoretical basis. These issues, as they relate to processor allocation, are discussed
in more detail in chapter 7.
Perhaps most important is the tradeoff of time and resources spent operating the
market versus the improvements in performance (if any) gained from its use. In particular,
in the WALR.AS-based processor market that I have implemented, the system spends on
average over 10 times as long computing market equilibria as it does executing processes.
()f course, this is something of a "toy" example in which the processes are very simple. In
a(lddition, no part of this system is designed for speed, and presumably market mechanisms
can be coded into hardware (possibly with a de(licate(l processor), resulting in drastic
speed improvements. Finally, real world markets (lo not "compute" equilibria b)ut evolve
to them over time. If time spent computing equilibria is too great, this solution may
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be used in a computer system as well. Even without those improvements, the benefits
of the market, should outweigh the time '"wasted" in operating it when the tasks to be
performed are large relative to the market operating time or the benefits outlined in this
chapter are highly desirable.
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Chapter 3
History of Related Work
Several substantial works have utilized economics for solving problems of computer sci-
ence or have paved the way for its use in the future. In this chapter, I briefly (lescrib)e
some of the relevant contributions of five significant works.
3.1 The Contract Net
Randall Davis and Reid Smith developed an extensive model of communication between
decentralize(l agents called the Contract Net[2]. Although the contract net is not a mar-
ket, per se, the work provides significant grounding for decentralized agents to participate
in a coordinated way. The distribution of tasks is viewed as a form of contract negotia-
tion. Because negotiation and exchange of information are often critical to the success of
a market, their work is very relevant to the development of complex market mechanisms
in which communication between participants is required.
In a canonical case, the contract net protocol proceeds in the following steps:'
* Task announcement. When a particular agent has (lecompose(l a task into subltasks
or has realized that its resources may not e ideal for completion of the task, it
issues a task announcement and serves as the manager of that task.
'See section 7.3 of [2] for a complete description of the contract net protocol.
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* Task evaluation. Other agents in the system may examine the task announcement
and (ldetermine if they have interest in the task and access to some or all of the
resources necessary to complete it.
* Bidding. Agents that are interested in an announced task submit "bils." These
are not bidls as in an auction, but refer to a set of capabilities and qualifications
relevant to the task.
* Bid evaluation. The manager of a task evaluates the bids and determines to which
agent(s) to award the contract.
* Awarding. The manager conmunicates an award message to the selected agents.
These nodes are termed contractors for the task.
Contractors may then become managers of more finely divide(l subtasks, forming
an arbitrarily deep hierarchy as needed.2 Contractors may also communicate various
progress reports to the task manager as well as a description of results and a notice of
completion of the task.
By the mechanism of contract negotiation, the contract net allows for sophisticated
communication and coordination among processes which are under no central control.
3.2 Enterprise
Thomas Malone's Enterprise task scheduler [19] employs many of the concepts of the
contract net. The system is designed( to schedule tasks in a network of personal work-
stations. Rather than using the traditional view that each station be used only by its
"owner," Enterprise attempts to match pending tasks with the most compatible resources
available at run-time.
:2There is also nothing preventing the manager of a task from later becoming a contractor for some
subtask.
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This methodology increases the inherent power of a distributed network because the
machines are allowe(l to work together to a much greater extent. Malone found that
significant performance improvements were realize(l in systems with aout to 10 work-
stations, though the benefits leveledl off for larger networks.
One of several reasons for the observed improvements is that the system is able to
take advantage of unuse(l processing power. When a station's "owner" does not have any
pendIing tasks, the station will remain idle in a traditional network system. Enterprise
providles a way to take advantage of this ille time b)y scheduling pending tasks from other
inachines or executing lower priority tasks on the otherwise idle processor.
Malone further finds even under very unreliable information concerning estimates of
processing time and resource demands, as well as task priorities, that the Enterprise
system usually allows for noticeable improvements over standard network management
techniques.
However, the Enterprise system does not use a market to determine the relative values
of different tasks. In fact, these values, which Malone calls "priorities," are (letermille(l
1b a variety of heuristics (including length of execution time), that to a certain extent are
arbitrary. See section 5.1 for more discussion of priorities based on length of execution
time alone.
The Enterprise d(istributedl scheduling protocol proceeds with the following essential
steps:3
* Request. A client (similar to a manager in the contract net protocol) announces
a task with the level of priority, description of require(l resources, and( enough
information for machines to estimate processing time.
* Response. Unused machines "bid" by giving their estimated processing time for the
task. Busy machines form a queue of processes on which to bid when they complete
their current task.
:See [19], figure 2 and surrounding discussion, for a complete description of this protocol.
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* Task assignment. The client evaluates l)ids and awards the task to the most appro-
priate machine. If no bids are receive(l then the task will be awarded to the first
bidding machine.
In addition, a client may cancel a task request at any time, and is required to (do so
rwhen a contractor delivers a task completion message.
In summary, the Enterprise system provi(les a greatly improve(l method of utilizing
resources and responding to the changing needs of a network's users as a whole.
3.3 SPAWN
Carl Waldspurger et al. have implemented a system called SPAWN [29] that is more
directly based on market forces for allocating resources in a distributed network. The
system allows much greater capacity for tradeoffs between resources of different quality
than does Enterprise. This allows more efficient resource allocation (in an economic
sense). For example, a fast processor will normally have a higher price than a slower one.
Tasks that (lo not need much processing speed can pay less for their computation than
those requiring more processing power.
SPAWN provides the first framework for an actual market in computational resources.
The relative values of lifferent resources are dleterminel ill a market, al(l relative impor-
tance of tasks is determined primarily by funding: tasks with more funding will be able
to ocutbi(l those with less and thus buv the most (lesirable resources.
SPAWN provides an elegant solution to the problem of scheduling posted tasks on a
distril)uted, homogeneous network. It. b)uilds on Enterprise and the Contract Net, and
allows market forces to determine relative prices (and thus implicitly relative value or
importance) of resources. SPAWN also provides significant practical evidence that a
computational economy canl in fact offer many of the benefits of economics that were
espouse(l in chapter 2.
However, because SPAWN is designed as a task scheduler, it does not use markets to
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determine the relative merit of different tasks. Instead, task have sponsors, and, much
as in the escalator algorithm ([21]; also discussed here in section 5.7), these sponsors can
provide more and more funding as time passes and the task has not yet executed.' The
use of pure markets to determine relative valuations of tasks might result in some tasks
never executing because they are always outbid. In a standlard( task scheduler, this is
very undesirable. See section 4.3.2 for a complete analysis of the lifference between task
scheduling and efficient processor allocation.
Furthermore, NWaldspurger's paper leaves the decision concerning how to evaluate
processes' b)i(ls entirely up to each machine. Although the distributedl network has several
addllitional complications, such as the need to promptly return control of a workstation to
its human owner, some of my research may apply to the problem of entering and choosing
among bids for processing resources, even in this rather different application.
3.4 WALRAS
Michael VNellman's NWNALRAS architecture [30] provides a means for creating general
agents in a computational economy using the Common LISP Object System. My iniple-
mnentations are all built on the WALRAS mechanisms, and are discussed in chapter 6.
In this section, I describe in more generality some of Wellman's accomplishments.
"AWALRAS is a general 'market-oriented programming' environment for the construe-
ti)on andll analysis of d(istril)ute(l resource allocation systems, based on general equilibrium
[30, abstract]." Its primary intended( purpose is to allow complex (listributed prol)-
lerns to be transformed into a general equilibrium problem in economics. WALRAS can
then be used to compute the solution to the original problem by computing the general
equiliriu. .
NVALRAS provides a means of (defining various parts of an economy. A good represents
"This represents a gross over-simplification, but is sufficient to understand the basic mechanisms.
5The method used to solve for the equilibrium is a variation on a method suggested by Leon Walras,
a French economist, after whomn Wellman's system is named.
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anything that can be traded, including services performed by processes. An auction
represents a mechanismn for accepting bids and determining prices for a specific good.
Agents can be any sort of entity which will participate in an auction. Consumers are a
broad class of agents who participate by maximizing certain supplied utility functions.
Consumers are usually endowed with some amount of various goods, which they attempt
to trade so as to maximize utility. Producers are a broad class of agents which participate
by maximizing profit from transforming certain inputs into certain outputs (which is
meant to include services). Bids are entered by any agent participating in an auction,
and are generally dividle(l into supply bids an(l demand bids. These bids( are given as a
partial function of quantity demanded (or supplie(l) versus price.
WALR.AS computes the market equilibrium for all auctions taken together in an atem-
poral fashion. Specifically, it computes only the equilibrium prices from the current bids.
The system does not directly account for any sort of ongoing market activity. However,
it can be applied repeatedly to achieve a discrete approximation to a continuous market
system over time. The current implementation of the RECON system [12] employs this
methodology.
N;WALRAS also makes an assumption often called "perfect competition" in economics.
Specifically, each agent considers prices as "given," neglecting the effect of its own ac-
tions on the equilibrium price. This assumption results in increasingly optimal in(livi(lual
behavior as the number of participants in each auction is increased. However, the assump-
tion does not allow for monopolies or small groups of suppliers to exploit "market power,"
w hich often would mean the ability to increase profits b)y increasing price. Though agents
ini this situation will not be acting in a completely rational way (i.e. acting to maxiinize
in(livi(lual benefit), there may actually be some advantages to eliminating market power.
In particular, no anti-trust regulations like those used in real-world economies should l)e
required.
Wellmanl has successfully used the NWALRAS system to solve d(istribluted( transporta-
tion resource allocation problems, but I will not provide those details here.
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3.5 The Work of Drexler and Miller
Mark Miller and Eric Drexler have written several papers [20, 22, 21] that justify the use
of economic methods on theoretical grounds and provide a variety of specific market-like
mechanisms. In particular, [22] provides a careful analysis of the use of economics in
computer systems at a general level. Miller and Drexler identify many of the similarities
a:n(l important differences between markets composed of human agents and( those to be
used in a computer. They discuss fundamental issues such as programmability of market
objects, availability of information, ownership, security, and currency. The paper also
discusses possible methods for and benefits of intertwining computational markets with
human markets.
In [21], Miller and Drexler provide a detailedl description of a market mechanism to
determine processor use in scheduling on a single-processor machine. They identify con-
straints on market mechanisms, and suggest a specific means of auctioning the processor.
The so-called escalator algorithm in discusse(l here in section 5.7, and the fundamental
difference between the the problems attacked l)y Miller/Drexler and those of this thesis
are described in section 4.3.2.
The paper also provi(les an elegant market-based storage management system, includ-
ing garblage-collection guided by market forces. The analysis of this allocation system
is very thorough and is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, a highly simplifiedl
discussion of storage rental is provided in section 7.2.
Since many of their observations, discoveries, and suggestions are directly relevant to
this thesis, I have incorporated them directly into the text with appropriate references,
and will not discuss them at length here.
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Chapter 4
Goals of Processor Allocation
Despite continuing advances in hardware speed andl power, it is very often an important
goal in computer science to make the most of limited time. In this chapter I present a
formnal definition of the optimal use of processor time, based on the economic concept of
efficient allocation as well as principles of rational decision-making. I also detail the goals
of a computation market which is used to allocate computation time, discuss what makes
the processor time market a non-trivial problem, and highlight a few general classes of
applications.
4.1 The Value of Goods and Services
In order to use market forces in allocating processor time, it is necessary to determine
thle relative values of goods present in the computational economy. (As used herein, a
computational economy means an economy in which computational resources and goods
are trade(l.) These goods may refer to specific values that can be computed or to any
other service that can be performed. Resources such as memory and disk space may
also be treated as goods, but are generally more complicated because they tend to be
used( over some period of time. (See [21] and section 7.2 for more discussion of possible
market mechanisms for these goods.) The processor itself is also a good, but has many
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properties that make it rather different from the services performed by processes. These
differences are discussed in the next section.
The computational economy must include buyers and sellers of goods with specific
preferences and production abilities so that relative values of goods may be determined.
There is no need to centrally assign values to any goods - the market equilibrium will
letermine all of their relative values from their availability and denandll. Throughout this
thesis, I will use the terminology used in Wellman's WALRAS computational economy
(see section 3.4)1 to refer to the various agents and mechanisms of the economy.
The market used to determine processor prices and allocations is directly a part of
this computational economy. The demand for services that can be performed (requiring
processor time) (letermines the market value of processing time. Symmetrically, the cost
of computing will affect the cost of performing these services, and thus their market price.
The economic general equilibrium determines all of these heavily interdependent trad(ing
ratios (prices). Therefore, in the absence of an economy for other goods and( services, a
market for processor time would not be meaningful.
In addition, it is convenient notationally to introduce a numeraire good whose price is
always equal to 1. This good serves as a sort of monetary unit to express relative prices
in terms of a common unit. To preserve the parallel between the numeraire and real-
wor(l currencies, it is required that no consumer explicitly value the numeraire except
as a means of acquiring desired goods. The actual value of the monetary unit will be
determined implicitly by the initial endowments given consumers. If every consumer's
endowment of the numeraire good is doubled(, for example, the prices of all goods (when
expressed in terms of the monetary unit), will also be doubled. There is no need for the
monetary unit to represent any specific buying power; its relative value will be (letermined(
in the market .just like the relative values of other goods. The purpose of the monetary
unit is to facilitate description of prices and to allow all transactions to take place in
the same denomination. The specific name of the monetary unit is, of course, of no
significance. When constructing examples involving specific values I will use the standard
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US currency $ notation to refer to the value of that good relative to the monetary
unit. For example, if the service of calculating the square root of some variable x has a
relative trading value equal to two units of the numeraire good, I will denote the price
of calculating V/ as $2. This is purely for notational convenience; these price have no
connection whatsoever to actual U.S. currency.
An important an(l very difficult question is how the various agents ill the economy
(especially the consumers) will determine their preferences. Tile consumers in the econ-
omly, taken as a whole, will be the directors of the systems. Their demandl for goods
a:nd services will determille what has market value and thus which goodls are prodlucedl
(usually meaning computed) and which services are performed. Determining consumer
preferences and( initial endowments of goods (including the monetary unit) is an unsolved
problem, but is not the subject of this thesis. Throughout the remaining discussion of
the goals and prol)lems of markets in processor time, I will assume that consumers and
prodlucers exist and can be used to determine the value of goods and services in the econ-
omyn. I use the terms processor market or computation market to refer to the bidding,
auctioning, and awarding mechanisms associated with the processor itself, but assumed
to bie part of a larger economy. I briefly return to the problems associated with (designing
market participants in chapter 7.
4.2 Special Considerations for Processor Markets
Although a processor market is similar in many ways to existing real-world markets, it has
several critical properties that taken together make it rather (lifferent from conventional
markets.
* The processor is unique. Only one process may compute at any given moment.
(This constraint is relaxed in a parallel-processing machine, b)ut there is still a
fixed finite supply of computation.)
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* The use of the processor is extremely time dependent. The past cannot be altered
and only the future use of the resource can be d(etermine(l. The resource is also
quantified in terms of time. The consumer of computation uses a certain amount
of time, which seems to indicate that prices and hi(ls should ble per unit time.
* There may be a minimum amount of computation time which has utility to a pro-
cess. This is the case when a computation does not produce valuable intermediate
results. It may be possible to partially sidestep this problem using some variation
of anytime algorithms[4, 16, 32], but it also may be desirable to require that there
be no intermediate results, for reasons discussed in section 7.4.3.
* The actions of a particular user of computation may drastically alter the nee(ls of
other market participants. The result of one computation may imply that a different
computation is now consi(lerablly more or less useful than it was before. As a
simple example, there may be several processes with a goal to calculate a particular
value. Once that value has been calculated, their bids to use the computer for that
purpose will be withdrawn. There is also tile general possibility that a particular
use of computation has positive externalities (see section 7.6.3) that may not b)e
accounted for automatically by the market.
* Computing now is usually better than computing later. This is a very strange form
of future devaluation. Unlike inany real-word goods, which physically deteriorate
or become technologically inferior with the passage of time, the processor will seem
to be just as good when the future actually arrives as it is now. Still, it will often be
more advantageous to use the processor now than to wait and use it in the future.'
· Processes may l)e either suspended or terminate(l if they are interrupted (presum-
ablly by a very high blid(ler). Determining which of these to (do may be very lifficult
and may even place constraints on the types of computations which are allowed.
'It is also conceivable that the processor may actually be more valuable in the future, especially in
the case where new technology is anticipated.
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* There is not an a priori reason to assume that the market must be "fair" in any
way. As an example, consumers may arbitrarily create bid(ling power (money) at
any time. if it is allowed in the model. The computational agents are very much
unlike human agents in this regard.
* Similarly, computational markets (do not require many of the regulations of real-
world markets. There is normally no concern of overworking, oppressing, or bank-
rupting agents in a computational economy. Regulations that a(re imposed may b)e
considered more like physical laws than legislation, since the system can be designe(l
so that agents simply do not violate certain rules.
The first two dlifferences, uniqueness and time-dependence, cause the most separation
from normal markets. In most markets, the good is relatively divisible (into individual
oranges or gallons of fuel oil for example), and the buyer will simply take home however
imuch (many) he or she is willing to pay for at the current price. A processor market
does not work this way. In terms of real-world analogues, it is perhaps more like having
control over time itself: A process can (do nothing when it does not have control of the
computer. To further undlerstan(d why some different thinking may ble required, consid(er
the following plan for a person's use of time:
7:00 - 8:00 Wake up, eat breakfast, shower, etc.
8:00 - 9:00 Drive to work.
9:00 - 12:00 No important business. Save this time for later.
12:00 - 13:00 lunch
13:00 - 14:30 Meeting in which new work is assigned.
14:30 - 17:00 Get a.jump on the new work by using your saved time from the morning
to do a total of 5 and a half hours of work.
17:00 Go home.
29
Perhaps unfortunately, this kind of scheduling is impossible. An identical problem
exists in schedluling the processor, namely that an irreversible decision must be ma(le as
to what to (do nOW, and( processor time may not be inventoriedl.
All of these difficulties taken together call for a special mechanism for auctioning
processor time. Several such mechanisms are outlined in chapter 5. Some of the criteria
used to evaluate these models are presented in the following section.
4.3 The Ideal Computation Market
The ideal coml:)utation market should allocate the processor efficiently (discussed at
length in the next subsection), and also have the following general characteristics:
* Contain an implicit prioritizing mechanism that awards the processor to the most
':important" processes, as determined by market forces.
* Serve as a decision-maker by implicitly making rational decisions at each oppor-
tunitvy. 2
* Contain a simple mechanism to determine bids entered by processes. Also, these
bids shoul(d have some grounded meaning, and be easy to interpret.
* Allow for dynamic adjustment by making new decisions to accommodate an ever-
changing environment.
* Contain a computationally simple mechanism for taking bids and awarding the
processor based on these bids.
* Allow a default ordering of processes (a kind of plan) to be maintained that can be
execute(t if the costs of decision-making become too great.
2As always, "rational" means rational with respect to the agents' preferences. If the agents are
random and/or irrational themselves, then the allocations will also appear senseless.
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* Execute market calculations very rapidly compared to the time-scale of process
execution.
It may not be possible to achieve all of these goals simultaneously, but they will
serve as guidance in criticizing possible methods of allocating the processor. The last
goal may rely largely on implementation details and available hardware, but is still a
very important property for market allocation to have practical applications. Specialized
market hardware would be especially beneficial in this regard.
4.3.1 Efficient Allocation
Tihe most important property for a processor market is that it determine an efficient
allocation of the processor. Ideally, this would mean maximizing the value added to the
system by the production of new goods. I will refer to this as the ideal allocation, which
I now define formally:
An ideal allocation is one which, (luring any specific period of time, results in the
maximum possible amount of value added to the system by the use of computation.
Unfortunately, achieving this goal will usually be impossible, for two primary reasons:
1. In general, achieving this goal will require examining all possible paths of the sys-
temrn. Because each computation may change the value of future computations,
there is no other way to determine the maximum possible amount of value that
could be generated. However, examining these paths takes time3 and (luring this
time the processor is not being usedl in a way congruent with the above definition
of ideal allocation. Moreover, in the case where processor allocation will continue
into the future indefinitely, it will be impossible to explore all possible paths in any
amount of time.
3A very large amount of time, in fact, since the number of paths is exponential in the number of
processes, and testing each path can require executing every process along it.
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2. Even when all of these paths are examined, it may be that the path to creating
the maximum value for the first 1 second is not part of the path for creating the
maximum value for the first 4 seconds. As a simple example, suppose there are
only three processes, none requiring any inputs. Process A can produce something
currently valued at $25 in 1 secon(l. Process B can produce something currently
valued at $20 in 1 second. Process C call produce something currently valued at
$70 in 3 seconds. Further suppose that each process can only execute once (i.e. the
value of its service drops to $0 after one execution). Most importantly, suppose
that the execution of B causes C to be worth $80, though this is not known in
advance. Assume that the execution of A and C doi not affect market prices. The
ideal allocation for 1 second is to run process A. However, the ideal allocation for
4 secondls is to run process B and then C, since that will total $100, but A then C
will only total $95. Thus it is impossible to ensure that (luring every time period
the processor has been used for its maximum benefit (in terms of value add(le().
The realization that ideal allocation is generally impossible motivates the (lefinition
of a theoretically realizable goal which I will call an efficient allocation, though it might
also be called a rational allocation to draw a parallel with rational decision making.
Intuitively, an efficient allocation is one which comes as close to an ideal allocation as is
practical, subject. to the constraints that future values cannot be predlicted with absolute
accuracy and( that the past cannot be altered.
An efficient allocation is one in which the expected future allocation is ideal. Specif-
ically this nieans that at any instant the process that is running must be the one that is
the first step ill an ideal allocation for the future given the current valuations of goods
(which may take into account speculation concerning future value). An efficient allocation
will be ideal if the value of all possible future computations is known in advance.
The notion of efficient allocation, defined in this way, corresponds exactly to what
Russell and WVefald [25] [24] call meta-greedy algorithms. It corresponds to considering
only the set of immediately possible steps, b)ut estimating their ultimate effect in some
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time-bounded way. By choosing to limit the meta-d(ecision (deciding how to decidle
to decide...) to a single level, a very large gain over purely greedy algorithms can be
achieved( without consideration of the infin'ite regress problem [31] [18] [23].
The so-called meta-greedy approach (liffers from what is traditionally called the greedy
approach in computer science because it can include consideration of future events, in
this case in the form of heuristics or deliberation on the part of consumers. For iimy
research, I accept that the time spent evaluating the market (including (ecision-making
tinmle spent by consumers) may not be allocated ill a provably optimal way. However,
t his time can be indirectly considered by including market evaluation time in processes'
time estimates, as suggested in chapter 6. Furthermore, several possible approaches to
limiting deliberation time are possible, though a discussion of these methods is beyond
the scope of this work. The interested rea(ler should see [32], [25], and [26], as well as
references cited therein concerning bounde(l rationality.
The use of the word "efficient" in making this definition also deserves some justifi-
cation. Efficiency in economics is normally (lefined in the sense of Pareto Optiniality
(see section 2.2). Since the define(l allocation ensures maximum expected profit from
computation, any deviation from this allocation would result in at least. one agent being
worse off- the agent that is the beneficiary of profits from computation. It is in this
sense that the Pareto Optimality condition is satisfied and that the allocation (lefined
above can be called "efficient."
Now let us re-examine the example mentioned in proving the impossibility of ideal
allocation, but this time in terms of the definition of an efficient allocation. Since in the
example each process produces no value when run again, there is no need to consider
more than 5 seconds. The efficient allocation is A then C then B since A maximizes
the value added (luring the first second, C maximizes the value ad(lded (luring the next
three seconds, an(l B maximizes the value added (luring the final secondl. The efficient
allocation (liffers from the ideal allocation (B then C for the first four seconds) because
tlhe effect of B on C is not known.
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If it is known that running B will increase C's value from $70 to $80, then it is in
fact B which is creating the extra $10 in value. In the economy, this will be taken into
account by the fact that whatever consumers were willing to pay $80 for C's improved
output will ble just as willing to pay the $10 difference to B - it is of no significance to the
consumers who is actually generating the goods they value. In this case the new values
added blecome A: $25, B: $30, C: $70. Then the efficient allocation is B, A, C, which is
also an ideal allocation since the future values were known. However, if C will be run
many times in the future, every time improve(l by the fact that B executed, then it is
difficult to account for the actual value of executing B. This is precisely the problem of
positive externalities, discussed in section 7.6.3.
When the precise results are unknown, but there is some reason to suspect that B
may affect the value of C, it is possible that there are speculating consumers and/or
consumers who assign utility (and thus implicitly value) to experimentation. Either of
these types of consumers may be willing to pay to execute B just to find out whether B
afjfects the future value of C. It may be l)est to consider this service as a separate process
(call it D) whose output is "determining if B does something useful." The market will
assign some value to that service and if determining B's usefulness becomes sufficiently
valuable, then D will execute (and presumally also execute part or all of B).
4.3.2 Comparison to Scheduling
The efficient allocation has one striking difference from what I will herein call the schedul-
'ig problem. In the scheduling problem, processes are posted," meaning that they sud-
denly come into existence and need processor time to ble serviced. A scheduler must
eventuallv service all posted processes, a condition known as non-starvatlion. Each pro-
cess must be executed exactly once; if a process is to be executed repeatedly it must be
poste(l repeatedly. A pure market mechanism suffers from the disadvantage that some
processes may never be considlered valuable enough to run, in the case where important
processes come into existence at a sufficient rate that less important processes are never
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serviced.
When determining an efficient allocation of processor time, on the other hand, the
available processes are considered as tools. The most applicable tools are used and those
that (lo not become sufficiently useful (i.e. valuable to execute) will not be used. This is
exactly what is intended. Just because a process exists does not mean that it performs
anything valuable to the consumers, who, as mentioned earlier, are the implicit directors
of a computational economy.
If a market-like mechanism is use(l in a scheduler, then it must somehow be sure
that all processes eventually become sufficiently valuable to execute. This is precisely
the purpose of Drexler and Miller's escalator algorithm [21], which is discussed blriefly in
section 5.7.
Although efficient processor allocation does not require that tasks become more valu-
able the longer they have gone unserviced, there will certainly be cases where that will
happen. Consider a person trying to allocate her time efficiently. Perhaps an expected
colmmitment turns out to be more important than lunch one (lay, and later she decides
to postpone dinner because she wants to work out before eating. As the process" of
eating is postponed more and more its relative value increases. If b)y the next morning
she still hasn't eaten anything, breakfast may have much greater priority than getting to
work on time.
Although I have not experimented with it specifically, I am optimistic that the es-
calator algorithm could somehow be present in the consumer side of the economy, just
as in the human example above. Thus the relative valuations of unserviced processes
co-uld increase b)ecause of an actual change in demand(. This would allow the escalator
algorithm to be cast into a pure market system, in which bids for processor time directly
replresente(l the consumers' relative valuations of goods and( services.
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4.4 Applications
There are at least two broad classes of applications for a system that economically allo-
cates computation time.
The first class includes any system in which there are many possible processes to
execute, blut insufficient time to execute all of them. This is the case in the reasoning
systems mentioned in the introduction. The football spectator of section 1.1 has several
cloices, but her time is constrained. If she spend(s more than a few seconds up(lating
Ibeliefs, she will risk missing the next play or perhaps a replay. Thus a choice must be
mnade about what activity has the greatest value to her. An economic allocation system
is well suited to this sort of decision-making.
The second class consists of what I will call dynamically adjusting algorithms. The
purpose of the economic mechanism here is to be sensitive to the details of the subtasks
or to changing structural properties (either in time or encountered (luring exploration).
The market allocation mechanism allows the system to choose the algorithm that is most
appropriate to the specific section being dealt with at the moment, and( to alter the choice
of algorithm as appropriate to the structure of the problem as it is encountered. Research
in search by Russell and WNefald [25] has shown that it may be possible to gain significant
improvements by specializing the search method used locally. Although that work does
not use markets specifically, it points to the possible usefulness of (lynamically adjusting
algorithms. For the general case of this type of algorithm, the market allocation method
should prove very applicable.
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Chapter 5
Overview of Possible Models
]In this chapter I provide general discussion of several possible models for a market in pro-
cessor time, including the model that I implemented as part of the Reasoning Economy.
Some of these models have been suggested in part by other authors (especially Drexler
an(l Miller [20, 22, 21]), and others are original. Each model provides a mechanism for
assigning some type of market value to the good computation. However, the nature of the
equilibria that. result as well as the specific behavior of the system may be significantly
different over different market models. Here I describe the blehavior of each market type
and discuss advantages and disadvantages of each rmethod.
There are at least three fundamental ways to descril)e the good which is being sold
in a processor auction.
1. The good is a b)lock of time on the processor, definedl by a start and end time. For
example a process may buy a "license" to compute for 3 seconds from 11:50:25 to
11:50:28. The start time may also be now or given relative to some reference time.
2. The good is the processor itself. Control of the system is implicitly transferred to
the new owner.
3. The good is the use of the computer. The price refers to the cost per time unit of
use.
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The decision concerning what good on which to base the market is an important one
andl has significant implications to the behavior of the system as a whole. Indeed, it
can be argued that the choice of good type defines the market protocol anl that the
other aspects I have used to differentiate models in the following sections are details.
However, the distinctions that I have made are intended to exemplify possible behavioral
d(ifferences in different market mod(els rather than to provide a theoretic taxonomy.
5.1 A Time Block Model
Let us first consi(ler auctioning time blocks which begin now, meaning that only the
very next block of computation time is soldl. This model seems intuitively sensible but
presents an imme(liate problem: The various bidders in the auction are not bidding for
the same good. While one process may demand 3 seconds of computation time, another
may want 0.5 seconds, and in general it may be that there are as many different goods
as there are idldlers. For concreteness, suppose that the first process enters a bid of $6
for a 3 second slot while the second enters a bid of $4 for a 0.5 second slot. Since tihe
goods bid upon are different, it is difficult to compare these bids and make a decision as
to which process actually computes next. One possibility is to consider which process
Lids more per second, and in this case the second process has bid four times as much
($2/s vs. $8/s). This line of reasoning can eventually lead to the third approach above
in which the computer is auctioned at a per-time-unit price.
Nevertheless, a computation market protocol can be based on goods of the time-block
nature. However. a shift in perspective concerning what is meant by a bid is required. In
effect a process's bid s the amount of computation time demande(d, rather than a valua-
tion of the good to be purchased. Any number of specific mechanisms can then be built
on top of this scheme to decide how to allocate processor time based on these bids. Rea-
sonable possibilities include award(ing the processor to the process that has demandle(l the
least computation time (attempting to avoid bogging down tile processor with mammoth
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tasks) or that has demanded the most computation time (guessing that the long-running
tasks will l)e most important). Other awarding schemes are also possible, though it seems
unlikely that a theoretical justification can be provide(l for any specific method, since the
length of time to compute does not carry any inherent description of significance. It
is conceivable, for example, that tasks which accomplish nothing (useful) could require
any specific computation time. This model, therefore, is not guaranteed to result in an
economically efficient allocation of computation time. Thus we are not assured of any
tihe potential benefits of a market discussed in earlier chapters.
Despite the problems just mentioned, for some systems it may be possible to develop
a method of awarding the processor l)ase(l on time-block hi(ls which results in reasonable
behavior. The earliest implementation of RECON featured a market mechanism in which
the process requesting the most computation time was awarded the processor, provi(led
that the request exceeded a certain minimum time. This method of evaluating bids was
purely a(l hoc, but was chosen blecause under the specific constraints of that system, the
resultant behavior was not noticeablv unreasonable.
A further complication arises in any system in which the precise time of computation
of a particular process cannot be computed in advance. This will be the case in the
vast majority of systems since precise data is very rarely available for every possible
configuration of the parameters andi the environment. Thus a process can only determine
its exact execution time b)y executing, leading to an obvious Catch-22. The dlifficulty then
is this: suppose that at the end of the 0.5 seconds that. our example process bid for, it has
not completed its computation. If the computation does not produce any intermediate
values, cutting it off immediately will mean that it has accomplished nothing (it may
also be possible to suspend the procedure, which is discussed in chapter 7). This results
ill a situation often stu(lied in economic game theory. Since there is nothing that can
be (lone to alter the past, the decision is simply whether to allow this process to finish
its computation or to terminate it andi start another. If the initial time estimate of the
currently running process is assumed to be relatively good, it is reasonable to guess that
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it will finish soon (the precise time scale is unimportant to this argument). Thus the
choice is reducedl to whether to (continue to) run a process that will produce a useful
result in a very short amount of time, or begin running one that will be starting at the
beginning. Under most circumstances, the already running process will be the better
bargain.
So what's the problem? Suppose that a few milliseconds later it still hasn't completed
its task. The decision to allow it to continue is even more obvious now, because we have
every reason to believe that it will be (done even sooner than when we made the decision
to allow it to continue moments earlier. In principle, this allows one process to take over
the processor for an arbitrary length of time without any irrational decisions being made
al.ong the way.
The skeptical reader may want to consider a real-world example. Suppose you are
waiting on the th floor and want to get to the first floor as quickly as possible. You
know that on average it will take you 2 minutes to get down the stairs, ut only one
iinute to wait for the elevator and ride it down. So vou make the rational choice of
waiting for the elevator. After 2 minutes of waiting, you are still on the 5th floor, so your
chloices are to walk down the stairs, which will take 2 minutes, or to continue waiting for
the elevator which by now you can reasonably expect will take well less than one minute.
This process can of course continue, but even if the elevator does come immediately, it
still took you longer than if you had gone down the stairs. In retrospect it appears that
vou made the wrong decision, but in fact you made the best possible decision at every
opportunity.
This problem for a particular market mechanism is one which must be addressed, but
which has no general solution. It is conceivable to allow controlling processes to compute
indefinitely or to terminate them when they have exceeded their bidded time slot by a
specified amount. The second method is likely to be the b)est, but it introduces a certain
element of risk for any process, which must somehow be accounted for in bidding. The
risk arises because the process may ble terminated before it has achieved any result valued
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by the market. There is no reason to believe that this element of risk is a flaw, but it is
important to recognize its existence because it complicates the bidding strategies required
for processes. I have not investigated these strategies in any detail, however, because of
the significant disadlvantages of this model of computation markets outlined above.
5.2 A Futures Market in Time Blocks
A secon(d mod(el in which the processor is still auctioned in b)locks of time is suggested
)by real worl(l futures markets. In this model, the rights to future time slots are sol(l in
adlvance of the actual computation opportunity. Many of the same problems discussed
in the previous section apply to determining exactly how to sell these slots. Again the
goods deman(le(i are non-uniform, making it dlifficult to evaluate bids. It is conceivable
to take bids in length of time desired, as in the previous time block model, or to break
slots down into some smallest length, and allow purchasing of contiguous slots to perform
longer calculations. It is also possible to create a sort of default queue by simply giving
ealch process, as it is encountered, the next available slot in the future. A somewhat
d(ifferent possibility is dliscusse(l in the next section. In general, the details of how to sell
the future time slots could be very complicate(l, blut significant problems arise in this
mo(del regardless of the method of initial sale, so I will not discuss these details.
Instead, let us assume that the rights to all relevant future slots have already been
assigned, so that a sort of queue has been formed in which each process owns a particular
win(low in which. to compute. It is conceivable not to use the market mechanism again
and to simply allow each process to compute in the order determined. This gives up some
of the advantages of using markets, in particular capabilities for dynamic adjustment.
The system has only used economics as a planning tool and now executes that plan.
Since the market, mechanism itself cannot easily predict the results of each step of the
plan, this model of planning is likely to be significantly inferior to more traditional plan-
ning methods in computer science. However, the use of economics in planning problems
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pro)bably (deserves more exploration.
As an alternative, processes may sell their time slots (or any portion thereof) at any
time before the slot to be used has passed. This allows the market to adjust dynamically
to results of past computation. This complicates the coding of processes, however, be-
cause they have to have mechanisms and methodologies for buying and selling time slots
from each other, which in general is more complicated than selling computation time in
a central auction. At this stage we again encounter the problem that lifferent processes
may be trying to buy lifferent amounts of computation time from the same process.l
Unfortunately, the futures market model has a much more significant problem. The
initial queuing of procedures places arbitrary boundaries and (livides up the use of future
time into specific slices. However, there is no reason to believe that this slicing will be the
correct one for all possible paths of the system. This places large, inhibitory constraints
on making adljustments to future needs. Consider the following initial awarding of future
time slots:
A | B C D E B 
Further suppose that the system begins executing these time slots and( the following
ensues: Process A produces its result without any significant affect. on market prices.
Process B pro(luces a result that greatly increases the market value of a result that can
be produce(l by process A. So process A wishes to buy time slots from C and D. It can
buy all of C's time slot for whatever price can be mutually agreed upon. However, it only
wants to buy a small portion of D's time slot so that it can complete its computation.
Assuming that D can prod(uce no useful results if left with a smaller window, D is unwilling
to sell unless it can sell its entire time slot. So either A must buy the entire time slot
(in 'which case the latter part may go unused2 ), or D must. find another buyer(s) for
exactly the remainining time slot. Such a buyer is often not available, though it may
'Anyone who has played the card game PIT is aware of how difficult it can be agree to trades when
different buyers want different, but overlapping, parts of what yoll have to sell.
2Because computation by A may change market values of other executions, it is also possible that A
could sell part or all of it unused time after executing.
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be advantageous to design the system with one or more "'omnipresent" processes that
automatically execute (luring (lead time created il this way. The result is that large
blocks of time may ble either misallocated, as when the process using the otherwise idle
time is not actually the most valuable process at that moment, or unuse(l, which is likely
to be an inefficient use of resources. (There are several cases where idle time may not be
inefficient. Twc) representative cases are: 1) An event is expecte(l to occur in exactly 2
secon(ls which nee(ls immediate attention when it does occur. A process may be willing
to bid for the action of waiting two secon(ls and then attending to the event immediately.
This option will get more and more attractive as the time "wasted" to ensure immediate
service gets smaller. 2) The parallel architecture situation discussed in section 7.7 in
,vlwhich a process must hold some processors idle in order to obtain enough processors to
perform its desired computation.)
A third alternative is to require A to buy out D completely (at whatever price is
mutually agreed upon), an(l then move up the rest of the queue since A will not b)e
using the entire slot. This outcome is perhaps clearer (liagrammatically. The original
ownership is shown d(irectly above the new ownership of future time slots.
A B C D E |B
A i B A E I B
In the general case, this adjustment may not be valid because a process may have
purchased a time slot beginning at a certain time for a specific reason - perhaps because
of an event expected to occur at that. time. Such a process cannot simply be moved up
in the schedule because it may have nothing valuable to (ldo at the earlier start time.
When this type of adjustment is allowed, the futures model (degenerates into the time
bloclk model discussed in the previous section. What is happening in reality is that at
each opportunity, any process can buy the next time slice (from the current owner(s)).
The initial assignment of owners to future time slots only serves to complicate matters
and to require more elaborate market mechanisms for processes to l)uy anld sell from each
other. There is, however, a small advantage to structuring this model as a futures market,
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even though the behavior should be identical (except that the market calculations will
be slower when the queuing is revised regularly and faster when the queuing remains
unchanged). This way of designing the market allows the user to see a sort of planning
and replanning of tasks. Since there is always a queue of future tasks, there is a sort of
implicit statement of what the system "plans" to (ldo if nothing along the way makes it
necessary to rethink this plan. This is also may prove useful if the cost of replanning
becomes too great for some reason. In some situations it is better to act then to spend
any time considering what to (lo next.
5.3 Time Blocks Within a Window
Another way of auctioning time bllocks is to require that each process specify how long
it wishes to compute and supply a time period in which the computation must occur. In
addition it should supply the market value of its computation. For example, a process
mnight e able to produce $50 by using 3 seconds of computation beginning any time
between 11:51:23 and 12:02:15. It is not obvious how these bids would be determinedl,
but let us assume that all processes supply the auctioneer with bids of this form. In
many cases, it n-ay l)e possible to satisfy all of the bidding processes - algorithms exist
to determine such a solution if one exists.3
In the case where not all processes can be satisfied, the best solution is to remove
the minimum total value of computations that will allow all remaining processes to be
salisfied. Although this is certainly possible, the problem is clearly NP-Complete because
it require repeatedly solving the "Sequencing within Intervals" problem of the previous
paragraph.
At this point, we have assigned some sort of ownership to future time slots. Therefore,
further analysis of this model is identical to the futures market presented in the previous
section.
:3However, the problem is NP-Complete. See [15], pg. 70, "Sequencing within Intervals."
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5.4 Transfer of Processor Ownership
If the auctioned good is consi(lere(l to ble the processor itself, it can be bought and sold(
as though it were any other goo(l, with the current owner having the implicit right to
compute. The structure of this market is appealingly simple. Processes enter bidls for
the processor and if the current owner wishes to sell the processor to the highest bidder
then it does so. In a one-processor computer, the entering of bids cannot take place
continuously, so presumably an auction would ble held byr the owner whenever it. wishe(l
to consider selling the computer. An optional rule could also be included that the seller
cannot d(ecide to keep the computer after the auction, but must sell it to the highest
bidder. This sort of rule is usually used in auctions involving human buyers to preserve
a sort of "'fairness." This kind of fairness, is not, however, demandled( by computational
processes.
Despite its simplicity and apparent elegance, auctioning the computer itself has several
severe difficulties.
'The first problem arises on the bidding side of the auction. If we assume that each
process can determine a valuation of the computer based on the market value of its
execution, we would expect it to enter that value as its bid. For concreteness, let us
suppose that there are three processes an(l label them A, B, and C. Process A values the
computer at $100, B at $50, an(l C at $15. However these bids reflect only the fact that
each process will use computation time to perform services or computations that have
market value. For example, when process A finishes computing it can expect to be paid
$100 for its services, since that bid was determined from the market value of executing.
However, process A still owns the computer and can now sell it. Te computer has not
(levalue(d in any significant way (as would have a car, for example), so A can now sell
the processor for $50, the bid that B entered in the last auction. The result of A may
alter the exact valuation by B either up or down, l)ut since this cannot normally be
anticipated, $50 is likely to be the best guess.
Since all of this can be calculated at the time of the initial auction, process A should
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change it's valuation to $150. This reflects the true value of the processor to process A.
Similarly, if process B is awarded the computer in this auction, it can expect to sell the
processor to A for $100 after performing its own computation. Thus process B adjusts
it valuation to $150 as well. On this iteration, process C will change it's bid to $115,
expecting to b)e able to sell to A upon completion.
In the equilibrium, all three processes will enter bids of $165, each expecting to sell
it to one of the others who will in turn sell it to the third. Unfortunately, this is the
general case of this type of processor auction. If each bidder enters its true valuation of
owning the processor, all bidder will enter the same value. This value reflects only the
system's total valuation of the processor and the auction therefore does not provide any
mechanism for determining which process should execute next. The end result is that no
economically efficient allocation of processor time can be determined.
Of course, in. a computer system, processes can be programmed so that they do not
attempt to examine (or even predict) each other's bids an(l bi(l instead exactly at their
individual valuation. This will result in extra profits from the sale of the computer
after completing execution, blut some mechanism for redistributing these profits could l)e
dieveloped. The larger disa(lvantage of this method is that it will preclude most learning
algorithms for improving the quality of bids over time, since those methods would be
expected to converge onto the true valuation (as above).
A second problem arises from allowing ownership of the resource that controls the
entire system. Once a process has purchased the computer, it can, at least in principle,
complete as many computations as it desires. If it turns out that it values performing
an aditional computation more that it values money (with which to perform future
computations), it may continue to compute, optimizing its own utility at the possible
expense of the system as a whole.
However, this problem can similarly be avoided by programming all processes so that
they surrender the computer when they have completed the task for which they entered
the original bidl.
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The final problem is much more fundamental, and( refers to the nature of the equi-
librium determined by this type of market. Because processes are bidding for possession
of the computer, the value bild reflects only the market value of what it can eventually
accomplish, with no accounting for how long it may take. For example, process A can
perform a service that is value(l at $100: determining if an input program will halt in
less than 1 hour. Process B can perform a service valued at $10: determining the length
of an input program. Suppose further that every execution of process B is worth $10,
though this would often not be the case. Clearly, the $100 process will execute first,
blut in general it may take 1 hour for it to determine its result. During this same time,
process B could have determined( the length of an enormous number of input programs.
Since each service remains constant at $10 (by assumption), the processor could have
been used to generate orders of magnitude more than $100 worth of results during the
hour that it was used. Since all of this information was known in advance, this market
mechanism has misallocated the computation resource.
The crux of the problem is on the id(ling side of the mo(lel, and is an extension
of the bidd(ling problem discussedl earlier in this section. In the above example, B has
unldervalued the computer because it has no way of determining how long it should
own the processor. Since no process needs to own the computer for its entire lifetime,
it is difficult if not impossil)le to determine how much to be willing to bid. In the
over-simplified example above it turns out that B should lbuy the computer an(l then
compute indefinitely. But there is no systematic way of determining how much to blid
for ownership. Since it expects to profit indefinitely, perhaps it should bid an infinite
amount for the processor! This does not seem to make very much sense. To understand
this problem further, imagine that you are immortal and are entering into a market to
buy a house that will never need any maintenance. How can any specific maximum utility
lbe assigne(l to this'? Of course, a maximum bid can still be determined ly i(l(lilng all
remaining capital (plus loans if available) when other "needs" have been han(lledl.
If the processor is made to devalue with time and( the processes are made mortal
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(meaning that they are permanently removed after some maximum amount of time), then
these prolblems are greatly alleviated. However, since there is still no way to determine
in advance how long a process will want to own the processor, there is no sstematic way
of assigning value to ownership.4
For all of these reasons, a model based on the transfer of ownership of the processor
cannot l)e guaranteed to result in an efficient allocation of processor time.
Sale of the processor can also be extended to a futures market which resembles real-
world futures markets even a bit more than the time block futures market described
earlier. This variation woul( allow processes to make an agreement that one would sell
the processor to the other at a specific time for a specified price. This represents a sort
of speculation on the part of the processes concerning the future value of computation
time.
The extension to a processor futures market is not a distinct model because the
owner of the processor is, in general, free to make whatever sorts of sales agreements it
wishes. The disadvantage of allowing speculation is that the allocation of the resource
is committed to in advance and may not be the best allocation possible when the time
comes. However, the futures market does offer one of the principal advantages of its
real world analogue, namely the aility to transfer risks. A process buying the computer
may be taking a certain risk that the future value of the computer will be significantly
less than expected (or even zero, as in the case where the process "completes" the task
defined b the consumers' demand). In a futures market, a process may eliminate risk
ibv agreeing to a mnutually acceptable future price at which it knows it will be able to sell
the computer. In a case where the process would not have been willing to bid given the
risks involved, the futures mechanism may prove very useful.
'
1 When there are a large number of processors available, such that every process can eventually expect
to own a processor, this problem may disappear. The market becomes very much like a real-world housing
market. This is in essence a matching problem. See [19] for a thorough analysis of a closely related
pro b lem.
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5.5 Processor Rental
In this section I introduce a model based on renting the processor at a rate per unit time.
This corresponds to the third goo(l description at the very beginning of this chapter.
Because a form of this mo(lel proves to be successful in assuring efficient allocation of
computation time, I have implemented a first-generation version of this model within
the Reasoning Economy (RECON). A description of the implementation and further
comnments about my experience in practice can e found in chapter 6. In this chapter
I describe rental models abstractly and show that the "improved' form will result in an
efficient allocation.
5.5.1 The Pay Phone Analogy
The simplest model of renting the processor is suggested by an ordinary pay phone. In
this model customers (processes) pay according to some fixed rate scale for the use of
the phone (computer). When more than one process desires to use the processor at the
sa:me time, they form a first-in first-out queue. Thus this system corresponds to queuing
up processes which are willing to pay at the set rate. This system does not place any
priority on processes according to how much they are willing to pay, however, and thus
defeats the primary purpose of using a market. In addition, when no processes can afford
the going rate, the processor will sit idle when perhaps many useful computations could
Lbe performed.
5.5.2 Improved Processor Rental
A siinple modification to the pay phone model results in an enormous improvement. For
the remainder of the thesis, the "Processor Rental Model" will refer to the following
extension: The price is now allowed to be fully variable and the processor is awarded
to the process that is willing to pay at the highest rate. Only if no process enters a
non-negative bid will the processor remain idle. If idle time is especially undesirable, a
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set of processes that are always willing to compute at a price of $0 may be made part
of the sstem. However, in some systems (including RECO(N) it Inay be desirable to
discontinue computation when the processor reaches a value of $0 per time unit. This
will often correspond to the situation where all of the consumers have been satisfied or
removed, implying that all "goals" of the system have been achieved.
The auction side of this model is straightforward. Given all of the bids the processor
is simply awarded to the process entering the highest bid. The exact rate that is charged
can l)e anything greater than the second-highest bid and less than or equal to the winler's
lbid. (See [21], section 2.1.1 for concise discussion of relevant auction mechanisms.) The
Nwinning process is then free to compute at that rate until it runs out of money, completes
its desired computation, or is outbid by another process. The last may be barred by
conducting a new processor auction only when a process releases control. The issues of
interruption and( suspension (and a related constraint which I have called atomization)
are discusse(l in chapter 7.
'To determine processor bids, we must find the maximum rate at which the process
can expect to make a profit by computing. If the process expects to have a loss incurre(
1-,yy computation, then it will not be willing to compute. Thus the maximum rate that a
process will accept will be its expected profit from computation divided by some estimate
of the time that it will take to perform the computation. Processes which wish to guard
against any possil)le losses may estimate their execution time conservatively (meaning
on the high side). Specifically, the maximum bid rate is given by:
value of outputs and services - value of all other inputs
rramtmllr rate =
estimated execution time
At the bid rate determined by this formula, a process expects a net profit of exactly
$0, since the total amount paid for computation will be equal to the value created by the
colmputation. At any price below that rate, the process will expect to make a profit, so
will be willing to compute. Symmetrically, at any price above that rate, the process will
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expect a loss, so will not be willing to compute. Note that a process usually takes some
risk because it cannot know with absolute certainty that it will be able to complete its
computation in any specific amount of time. In some situations it may also be possible
that the market value of the outputs declines during computation. This particular risk
can be avoided by agreeing to the sale price of outputs before beginning computation.
(Over the long term, a process that executes repeate(lly and has a reasonable ability to
estimate its execution time, should expect these risks to be minimal since accidental
losses (from a low time estimate) will be compensated for by accidental profits (from a
high time estimate).
When a process can produce different total values of results in (lifferent amounts of
time, it is not quite as clear how to evaluate the maximum bid formula, since some of
thle terms can have many values. However, what we are interesting in is the maximrum
rate at which the process will want to compute for all combinations of parameters. As
long as a process can store all of its valuable results, we are guaranteed monotonicity of
output value over time. Thus for an arbitrary function of output value vs. time spent
computing, the maximum bid rate corresponds to the slope of the steepest line through
the origin which touches the curve at some point. Figure 5-1 shows a canonical case
where all valuable results are generated at the end of computation and a more general
case with a procedure whose result improve given more time to compute. In each case the
slope of tile dottedl line indicates the maximum bid rate. The intersection point indicates
the ideal amount of time for the procedure to compute since at that point it will have
generate(l value at the greatest possible rate. In the future any process may bid again
based( on the value that it can continue to create, though at a slower rate.
Tile numerator of the maximum bid rate fraction represents the value added to the
system by the use of computation time. Thus thile bid itself represents the average rate
at which value is added by computation. This observation enables an informal proof
that this model will indeed assure an efficient allocation of processor time. (Refer to
section 4.3.1 for the definition of efficient allocation.)
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Figure 5-1: Graphical Maximum Bid Rate Determination.
The model awards the processor to the highest idller and thus to the process gen-
erating value of the greatest rate. Since at each instant the rate of value being addlel is
imaximized, the value addlel (luring any expected future time period (equal to ftt b(t)(dt,
where b(t) is the b)id rate at any instant in time t, and to is now) is also maximized.
Therefore, this model does achieve an efficient allocation of processor time.
There are several important assumptions implicit in the argument above. Firstly, an
action which is in fact discrete has been made continuous. Specifically, the actual value
of a computation will often not be generated until the end of execution (in fact it may
be desirable to require this kind of "atomization," discussed in chapter 7). Thus any
process which is interrupted or runs over its time estimate will not actually be generating
value at the desirel rate. 5 Even without this probllem, equating the value added with
the integral above is not precisely correct. But whenever t corresponds to the end time
of some execution, the integral will in fact be equal to the total value generated during
that time.
However, if any process must be terminated before it is complete, then it is possible
that Inore value could have been generated by running one which would have finished.
5 The case of running over the time estimate is the same problem discussed in section 5.1 with the
e]Levator example. IJnfortunately, this problem cannot be avoided, and, as before, it will nearly always
be best to allow a process to continue to run. However, when time estimates are reasonably accurate,
the total errors should balance out over the long run.
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Thus the general case in which all computation must cease at a predetermined moment
deserves more attention.
The situation is similar to the age-old hypothetical question posed to humans: 'Sup-
pose you had exactly two weeks to live. What would you do?" Being placed in this
situation may result in rather different choices both for the person and for the computer
system. A complete discussion of this specific case is beyond the scope of this work,
but I will make several comments. The simplest improvement that can be made is to
simply disallow bidding by any process whose time estimate exceeds the amount of time
remaining. This will reduce the chance of the last" process being terminated before it
completes any valuable computation. Further improvements under a predetermined time
constraint are very difficult because it not known exactly how each action will affect the
value of future actions. Thus no effort to fill up all of the allotted time in advance can
1)e ,llaranteed( to succeed.
XWhen these caveats are understood andi accounted for, the processor rental model
detailed in this section can be ensured to provide efficient allocation of the processor and
rational use of time.
5.6 A Combination Model
It is also possible to combine various metho(ls of selling the processor to be used at differ-
ent times in different situations. For example the processor might be auctioned in time
blocks, but the owners be allowed to rent parts of their block to other processes. Almost
anEy combination is theoretically possible; the analysis is usually a simple combination
of the analyses of the component models. I discuss here only the model suggested by
real-world markets: Processes participate in an auction to buy the processor and( then
the owner may rent it exactly as in the rental mo(lel of the previous section.
This model carries all of the same bidding difficulties as the standard processor sale
mlolel. Tile advantage offered ·by this combination is that when ownvers are assume(l
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to be profit maximizers, the guarantee of efficient allocation is carried over from the
rental model. Indeed, the owner(s) in the rental model were abstract - only their profit-
maxinmizing nature was required for the analysis presented there. The adldition of pro-
cesses as owners, though still just as difficult to administrate, may give a sense of the
general goal being attempted by the system. Though I have demonstrated that there is
no general solution for processor auctioning, it may be possible in some systems to achieve
a reasonable approximation. If this is this case, it may be possible to learn something
about the system's behavior by examining the chain of ownership.
5.7 Drexler and Miller's Escalator Algorithm
Drexler and Miller outline a modlel for auctioning the processor in [21], which they call
the escalator algorithm. This model is intended for use in what I have herein called
the scheduling problem. It is designed( to allow some prioritizing while still ensuring that
every posted process eventually executes. In this section I briefly describe this model and
explain why it cannot be carried over into the domain of the efficient allocation problem
d(iscussed in this thesis. It should be emphasized that this is not in any wav a refutation
of Drexler and Miller's work.
The escalator algorithm transfers control of the processor to the highest bidder just as
in the processor sale or rental models described( earlier. Once a process gains control of the
processor, it is filly serviced, meaning that it completes any desire(l computations. The
bidding side of the market is completely dlifferent, however. Each process is place(l on an
'escalator," meaning that its bid will automatically increase linearly with time. There are
two ad(litional market parameters that specify the maximum initial value of any bid and
the maximum rate at which a bid can "escalate." Drexler and Miller demonstrate that
under these conditions, any process which is placed onto tile fast escalator allowed must
eventually execute. Processes not on the fastest escalator will also eventually execute
except un(ler very unusual circumstances.
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The initial bid value and the choice of escalation rate define in some way the urgency
of a particular task. A maximally urgent task will enter the maximum allowed initial
'bid with the maximum allowed escalation rate. ()ther tasks will choose lesser values.
However, these values are not determined by market forces. The values of the bids in
fact carry no specific meaning as to the value of the task. Increases in bid value are
automatic, and also may not reflect any actual increase in the value of performing that
tas:k.
Because non-starvation is unimportant in the efficient allocation problem, these bids
do not carry the desired meaning. Specifically, there is no information available as to the
expected value adde(l by a particular computation, so it will be impossible to achieve an
economicallyv efficient allocation as define(l herein.
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Chapter 6
Implementation
I have implemented a very simple form of a processor market within the Reasoning
Economy [12]. In this chapter I explain the implementation and comment about its
oblserved(l ehavior.
6.1 The Underlying Architecture
In this section I escribe the system into which my processor market fits from a top-down
perspective. These divisions are not absolute in the code, but the system is roughly
divided into three packages, not including the WALR.AS system on which the reasoning
economyv is built.
6.1.1 AMORD
AMOR.D [3] is a pattern-matching rule-based language. AMORD keeps a record of pos-
s.lble beliefs, each labeled as "in" (believed) or "out" (not yet believed). The Reason
Maintenance System (RMS), described in the next section, keeps track of these label-
ings.. AMORD then queues up facts and rules from the "in" group based on matching the
pattern of rules with believed facts. The AMORD system itself, in the current implemen-
tation, does not -use any economic principles in guiding its operation. Specifically, facts
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and rules to combine are not queued up according to any sort of prioritizing mechanism.
The execution of AMOR.D results in new reasons for beliefs, which may call for
updating of beliefs. See section 1.1 for general discussion and an example regarding
belief maintenance.
6.1.2 RMS
The Reason Maintenance System is responsible for all of the updates which may be
mandated by tile operation of AMORD. Among its many tasks is the organization of
beliefs into nodes (containing a single fact or rule) and locales (groups of nodes, not
necessarily forming a partition, which are somehow related to one another). The RMS
permits reasoning in one or more locales, but the current implementation of AMORD
conducts all of its reasoning in a single locale.
Tilhe RMS must also relabel no(les from "in" to "out" or vice-versa as necessitated
by the reasoning being performed. (For more discussion of reason maintenance and
nonmonotonic reasoning see [6], [7], [8], [9], [11], and [10].) The RMS uses the Reasoning
Economy (RECON) to determine which relabelings to perform when.
6.1.3 RECON
As mentioned in section 3.4, the Reasoning Economy is built on top of WVellman's VAL-
RAS market-oriented programming environment. RECON creates a good for each pos-
sible service that can be performed by an available process. It also creates specialized
consumer(s) that, assign utility to the particular service. Tile two most common services
requiring computation as an input are node relabeling and locale relabeling. A nodle-
labeler examines a particular node and (re)labels it as "in" or out," as directed by the
RMS. The locale labeler performs a coherency update on all of the nodes in a given
locale.
From the utility functions and endowments of currently active consumers in RECON,
WV/ALRAS determines the market prices of all of the goods and services. Most important
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among these for the processor market is the market value of each of the possible actions:
the various node-labelers and the locale-labelers.
The processes which perform these services are instantiated as producers. As such,
they must provide bidls for all of their required inputs, including computation. The
'WALRAS environment providles generalized procedures for bidding, so that all that is
require(l is to create new methods specialized to computation.
6.2 The Processor Market
In order to implement the processor market within the RECON system, several simple
extensions were required. First a good representing the rental of computation had to
be establishedl. I called this good C)OMPUTER,-CONTR,()L since the ownership of a
single unit entitles the owner to compute (at the market rental price per unit time). The
auction for COMPUTER,-C(-)NTROL is established directlv by y WALRAS, but supply
and (lemandl bidls must still be definedl.
Since the processor is a unique resource in the RECON single-processor system, the
supply of C(OMPUTER,-CONTROL in each auction should be exactly one. Since the
supplier of COMPUTER-CONTRC)L must be a profit-maximizer in order for the rental
no(ldel to ensure an efficient allocation, a specialized producer named COMPUTER,-
SUPPLIER was created. The COMPUTER,-SUPPLIER. really just represents the pro-
cessor itself, but as a WALRAS agent it has a production function that enables it to
"produce" one unit of C()OMPUTER-CONTR,OL with no inputs.
With these agents a NTWALR,AS auction can be created for COMPUTER-CONTR,)L
that will automatically select the highest bidder in equilibrium. All that remains is to
construct a bid(ling method for producers which require computation an input. Pro-
ducers of this type are all derived fromn a subclass of producers called COMPUTATION-
PR.()DUCERS. Therefore the DEMAND-MAPPING method specialized to COMPUTA-
TION-PRODUCERS simply implements the maximum bid rate formula of section 5.5.2.
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bid value
Figure 6-1: Demand Curve for Individual Producer.
The DEMAND-MAPPING returns a procedure which takes as input a price and outputs
the number of units demlandlel b)y the producer at that price. For the single-processor
eenvironment, this output is simply 0 when the price is above the maximum bid rate and
1 when the price is below the maximum bid rate.
In order to create this mapping, each producer must have an associated time estimate,
which I have implemented in the form of a method called TIME-ESTIMATE. A TIME-
ESTrIMATE method takes a producer as its argument (and thus indirect access to most
environment variables) and computes an estimate of the number of seconds that will be
necessary to perform the desired service. For the RECON environment, these estimates
are base(l on statistical data from several runs of a blocks world reasoning example. It is
uncertain if these estimates would generalize to other domains.
In addition, I have chosen to include in each time estimate the amount of time that
finding the market equilibrium will require. This gives proper economic incentive to run
p;,rocedures that accomplish relatively larger tasks and will not require wasting" time by
repeate(l running of the marking equilibrium algorithm.
This DEMAND-MAPPING implicitly created a complete demand "curve" which is
a step function, shown in figure 6-1.
WNALRAS then aggregates all of the deman(l for COMPUTER-CONTROL and finds
the equilibrium price as the intersection of the aggregate demand with the (aggregate)
supply, shown in figure 6-2.
This mechanism determines the auction winner and the equilibrium price of compu-
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Figure 6-2: Aggregate Supply and Demand Intersection.
tation. Note, however, that the equilibrium is not usually unique, as the curves overlap
each other on a horizontal segment. At any price along this segment (open on the left
end and closed on the right end) this market is in equilibrium. The current implementa-
tion does not take this account specifically and simply uses whatever price the iterative
convergence method employed b)y WALRAS finds. However, the auction with the most
justifiable behavior (see [21]) seems to be the second-price auction, in which the price
charged to the winner is the minimum equilibrium price.
In the simple RECON environment, the processor market is really only used to choose
b)etween the option of relabeling a single nodle and relabeling the entire locale. However,
the results are encouraging, as the system seems to perform as would be hoped( at an
intuitive level. When the size of the locale is small or when a very high percentage of
nodes need relabeling, the market tends to choose the locale labeler since its execution
has great benefit and the time to execute will be acceptable in either of these two cases.
However, as more and more beliefs l)ecome part of the system, the in(divid(ual node labelers
are selected much more frequently because the blenefit of total coherence is outweighed
by the large amount of time required to ensure it.
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Chapter 7
Further Issues and Open Problems
The development of computational markets is really in its infancy. In this chapter I
discuss some of the major issues that remain as well as several of the possible difficulties
in using the computational market in practical applications in the future.
7.1 Consumer Preferences and Bidding Methods
The research and models presented in this thesis are limited in rationality in that they
make rational allocations based on the consumer's preferences. If the consumers in the
economy make "irrational" judgments albout which goods and services are preferred over
others, then the system as a whole will seem to exhibit irrational b)ehavior, even though
the processor allocation mechanism is still performing rationally within its do)main.
Thus the task of the programmer developing within a market environment consists not
only of programming the actual routines which will b)e the producers in the economy (see
section 7.4), but in specifying consumers by their utility functions and initial endowments
of goo(ls, including the monetary unit. A few general guidelines are suggested directly
byv rmy research:
* Consumers that are endowe(l with more total value of goods will have a greater
influence on the allocations of the processor, at least in the short run. This principle
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follows directly from the fact that these consumers will be able to bid more for the
goods that they value than those with smaller endowments.
* In the long run, consumers which make the most profits will have the greatest
influence on processor allocation. In general, consumers profit from some sort of
ownership of producers. However, the details of profit (or loss) distribution also
constitutes an open problem. It appears that a well designe(l transaction and dis-
tribution mechanism could serve as a kind of consumer selection device. Those that
profit over the long run will be the principal directors of the system in the future,
while the others will be bankrupt or represent relatively insignificant deman(ls. O)f
course, selection does not solve the aforementioned problem of "irrational" con-
sumiers.
* Just as in economics, utility functions need only give relative preferences. The
specific values of the utility for a particular consumer and bundlle of goods are of
no significance except relative to one another.
Unfortunately, these guidelines only provide a rudimentary foundation for building
consumers. In general several very large problems remain:
The number of agents. At an abstract level, the number of agents participating in
the economy will determine how decentralized the decision making process really is. If
there is only one consumer the processor will be allocated solely based on that consumer's
demandls. If there are many consumers with comparable wealth, no individual will have
a strong influence on the market prices. In some cases increasing the number of agents
may simplify the task of individual agents, as is the case with arbitrageur agents (see [30],
section 4.3). It seems likely that there is no way to determine in general the "optimal"
number of agents.
Utility functions. The consumers' utility functions will determine what the system
considers to be important or unimportant. Presumably these utility functions should
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somehow be compatible with the preferences of the user of the system. Otherwise the
computer will spen(l time producing results that are not significant to the user's applica-
tion. However, establishing realistic utility functions for humans has proven difficult in
somie cases. It remains to be seen if the construction of these functions is easier or more
difficult for computational economies.
A further problem arises if new goods or services may be invented )by the system
wthile it is running. The programmer may not be able to anticipate all such goods
and thus the consumers may be unprepared to establish preferences concerning tradeoffs
bletween the old good(s and( the new ones. In the RECON system, this problem is dealt
with by introducing new consumers which value the new good and bring endowments
that include at least some of the "old" goo(ls. This enables tradeoffs to be established
between all goods without requiring existing agents to place any utility on the new good.
This method appears to be acceptable within the RECON domain, but seems somewhat
arbitrary and unsatisfying. Certainly human agents establish utilities (implicitly) for
new goods regularly.
Endowments. As mentioned above, consumers with larger endowments will have greater
influence in the economy. Thus the decision concerning the endowment for each consumer
is a non-trivial cne. ()ne possible approach is to simply endow every consumer equally,
but this cannot be justified base(l on "'fairness," since fairness is not necessary for compllu-
tational agents. Again it seems unlikely that a theoretical justification can be provided
for any particular scheme of determining initial endowments.
Grants. In a computational economy, it is conceivable to create money and grant
it to particular consumers. I have not explored the desirability of such an option or
how it would affect the economy as a whole. Obviously, it would have macroeconomic
implications such as inflation, and perhaps is b1est studiedl by applying research from
mrlacroeconomics.
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Bankruptcy. Since consumers will spend their money primarily on services, those that
(do not own shares in any producers may eventually become bankrupt. In this case it
is either possible to remove the consumer or to provide the consumer with a grant so
that it may return to l)ildding. Although the latter option could result in an incentive to
go bankrupt, a computational economy can be controlled more directly and consumers
can be ma(le to operate without considering impending grants. In general, though, it
seems more sensilble to remove these consumers or to try to avoid them entirely be having
profits from computation re(listributed to all consumers.
As menltione(l throughout the earlier chapters, the consumers will serve as the implicit
directors of computation in the computational economy. As a result design of consumer
agents is critical to the success of a system based on a computational economy. Although
this may seem like an enormous restriction on the usefulness of this model, it is actually
a natural consequence of rational d(ecision-mnaking. In order for any reasoner to make a
decision about what is important to spend time on, it must have some way of determining
the relative importance of difference possibilities. This is precisely what preferences are.
Th]:lough this (does not prove that consumers and computational economies are required,
it indicates that any system which must make allocation decisions must have some sense
of preferences. Thus to a certain extent the above considerations an(l problems may be
u n]avoi(lable.
On the other hand, it is not clear that consumers must be designe(l perfectly. In some
cases it. will obvious that one service should be preferred to another. For the muddled
cases, it may not be terribly important that tile preferences be exactly correct. The
system mayi choose to do something that isn't necessarily the "l)est" possible option for
tihe task at hand, but it's likely to be much closer than if it had been attemnpte(l with no
preference information. Only further experimentation with computational markets will
reveal how important tile details of consumer design really are andl to what extent it will
be possible to develop user-friendly environments for creating them efficiently.
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7.2 Markets for Other Computational Resources
A.lthough my research is concerned primarily with allocating the processor, there is no
reason that market allocation mechanisms should be limited in this way. Indeed, many
of the same benefits of economics espoused in chapter 2 and elsewhere would be (lesiral)le
for allocating such resources as memory space and disk space. It is even conceivable that
resources such as win(lows or regions of the physical screen be allocated in a market.
There is usually still a significant time (lepen(lency, since, for example, memory might
be -used (luring a particular computation and then freed. As a result the rental protocol
again seems to be the most attractive. There are many unresolved details remaining,
but combining some of Drexler and Miller's research with bidding methods parallel to
those suggested for processor markets yields a general framework for rental of other
computational resources. Here I use memory space as the canonical example and (do not
a((lress the possible subtle differences between this market and( other similar resources
men-tione(l above.
Drexler and Miller have detailed a market mechanism for economic allocation of
mernory space[21]. This model is general enough to be applicable in the domain of this
thesis. Design of agents and auction rules for this system are detaile(l and carefully
analyzed in [21]. Careful attention is also paid to such considerations as allocations
of blocks being generally more efficient than allocation of individual locations. Here,
however, I ignore these details and present only the salient aspects of their model. I
have also adapted and extended certain parts of the theory to include market values (see
section 4.1).
The so-called rental-auction algorithm consists of processes entering bids for memory
space on a per unit memory per unit time basis. Translated into the general equilibrium
firamework used to "solve" markets within my research, this would mean producers giving
a d(emand (in memory units) at any given price (per unit memory per unit time). Memory
space can then be priced in the market, and rented to those processes desiring memory
at the market price. In Drexler and Miller's model, bidders must also supply a price at
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which to drop the memory. However, in this framework, the "drop" price will be inferred
from the point at which the (leman(d is zero.
Because themy do not have a market for all goods an(l services (section 4.1), Drexler
and Miller do not describe a specific method by which processes can determine how much
they are willing to pay for memory storage. However, the bidding analysis of section 5.5.2
can also be applied here. A process can (letermine the maximum rate at which it would
be willing to rent memory by the following formula:
value of outputs and services - value of all other inputs
maximum r ate = (estimated rental time) (estimated memory units required)
'This formula reflects the fact that at any price above that rate the process would
expect to lose money as a result of computation, since the total expected rental on the
memory locations will be the bid rate (above) times the number of locations rented times
the time that the memory is used. The resulting expected total cost of memory usage will
therefore equal the expected profit when the price is exactly the maximum rate above.
Alt any price above the maximum bid rate, the cost of renting memory would exceed the
profit from its use, resulting in a net loss. Symmetrically, renting memory at any price
below that level would result in a net profit.
At a quick glance it appears that the formula above could be combined with the
maximum bid rate formula for processor time (section 5.5.2), to show that the bidder
will always overspend. However, this is not the case. Tile phrase "all other inputs" used
in both formulas includes the other. The maximum bid rate for processor time must take
into account the cost of memory as an input, while the maximum bid rate for memory
space must take into account the cost of computation as an input. This interdependency
is common in economics and( does not interfere with determining the equilibrium by
iterative convergence.
In fact, tile inter(lependence reflects the very important tradeoff between memory
usage and(l time of execution, andl allows this tradeoff to be determinIled concretely in the
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market. When processor time is inexpensive relative to memory, algorithms that use
only a little memory but compute for a long time will be favored over those that require
more memory but less computation time. The reverse will be true when processor time
is expensive relative to memory.
On a single-processor machine in the absence of suspended or recursive procedures,
only the process which has control of the processor at that moment will need memory.
If the available memory is more than adequate for that process, memory may not e a
scarce resource and will therefore carry a price of zero. Furthermore, processes which
(to not acquire any computation time should not bid for memory (in equilibrium), since
th.ey will presumably have no use for it. These intuitions are also reflected in the bidding
mechanism dlescribe(l in this section. In the equilibrium on a single processor machine
it must l)e the case that the price of processor time exceeds the maximum bid rate for
all but one process. (Otherwise the (leman(l for processors would be greater than the
supply of one.l) Therefore, for all other processes bidding for memory, the numerator of
the maximum bid rate formula will be negative, since those processes would expect to
lose money even with zero-cost memory since processor time is already too expensive for
them. Since all other competitors enter negative bids (reflecting that they would have to
be paid for memory usage in order to make a profit), the process that wins the bidding
for the processor can enter a bid of zero for the memory that it will use.
However, when memory does become scarce (perhaps because of suspensions or mul-
tiple processors sharing a memory space), processes must rent memory space. This
establishes proper incentives for memory conservation and allows garbage collection to
be based d(irectly on evicting memory "tenants" who are no longer able to afford the
going rate. This may be because of outbidding by processes with greater importance,"
or because there are no longer any pointers to the information stored in that area.
1When there are exact ties at the highest hid level, no equilibrium will exist. This is very similar to
tlhe case shown in figure 7-2, which could just as well represent a single-processor scenario with vertical
axis rescaled. When this case arises in the RECON system, a winner is chosen arbitrarily. To extend to
the memory market, processes which are rejected in this way must explicitly realize to revoke bids on
resources which will not be useful without computation time.
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Most importantly, rental of memory space results in an economically efficient alloca-
tion, offering prioritizing and ensuring the best possible use of space when it becomes a
limiting factor.
The memory market presented in this section can also be extended directly to a class
of similar problems by redefining the meaning of a unit of memory. In the RECON
environment, for example, conflicts can potentially arise between processes that wish to
perform revisions on overlapping set of nodes. By considering an in(lividual node as the
unit of memory, bidding and awarding of "control" over each node can be performed
exactly as for a more finely divided memory market.
7.3 Interruption and Suspension
In a ssteil in which processes may enter bids at any time or where outsi(le "interrupts"
must be serviced within the market environment, it is possible that a process using the
processor may be outl)id before it has completed its desire(l computation. As mentioned
in section 5.5.2, interruption may have significant costs. When atomization (section 7.4.3)
is enforced, termination results in a loss of a great deal of effort since no valuable results
have yet been pro(luced(. Ideally. it would be desirable to avoid these losses by allowing
a process to suspend an(l then resume its computations when the price of processor time
has fallen to a level where it is again the high bidder. Of course, suspension also has its
costs, but in this case it is possible to assign these costs to the suspended procedure, thus
allowing for market trade-offs so as to allocate resources efficiently when suspension and
termination are possible.
The mechanism is based directly on the storage rental mechanism (lescribed in the
previous section. Suspension becomes the default action when an active process is outbid.
The suspended process must then pay the rent for the memory locations that it must
preserve in order to be al)le to resume its computation in the future. When memory is
not a scarce resource, suspension will have no cost and this will be reflected by a zero
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price to preserve necessary memory locations. However, when memory blecomes scarce
(perhaps because of many suspended processes), the cost of maintaining a suspended
state will reflect the true cost of suspension to the system.
When a process is no longer able or willing to pay the rent on its memory locations,
it will be terminated. Thus processes are only terminated when it is necessary, in the
sense that the costs of suspension now outweigh the benefits. Clearly a process with no
funding can no longer pay for its memory locations when suspended. However, there
may also come a point when the process projects that it will be less expensive to start
the computation over again than to continue to pay for the menlory locations needed to
remain suspendlel. The details of how this decision shoul(l be made as well as how much
to bid for memory while suspended is an important area for further research.
Of course, this model ignores the costs that may be incurred from the actual acts of
suspension and( restart, but it seems that these costs will normally be negligible. If the
costs are in time or in small amounts of additional memory, then the suspended (and
later restarted) process can be ma(le to pay for these costs as well.
7.4 Programming Constraints
In addlition to the significant considerations for consumers discussed in section 7.1, utiliz-
ing the market mechanisms for allocation of computational resources also has an effect on
how the individual procedures must be programmed. There are three specific constraints
discussed in this section which may have a significant impact on what programming idl-
ioms may ble use(l. Defining inputs and outputs and making execution time estimates
are required in order to use a market allocation system. The third constraint, which I
have called atomization, is a suggestion that can help to ensure that all computations
are carrie(l out as efficiently as possiblle within the market domain.
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7.4.1 Knowledge of Inputs and Outputs
In order to participate in the market, a process must know what its required inputs and
comIputed outputs and services are so that it can determine the profit to be gained from
the use of computational resources. This is analogous to data-dependency programming
ulsed in parallel programming algorithms. In many circumstances it is quite clear what
c:on(litions must be satisfied before a particular procedure can execute successfully. How-
ever, it may not always be simple to phrase these conditions in the form of required input
goods or services.
Since a routine is normally designe(l with a specific computation or service in mind,
the outputs of a particular process should usually be obvious. However, in some cases a
process may not lbe able to guarantee its outputs and will have to consider this risk when
inmaking its b)i(ls.
Furthermore. there may be a significant problem in describing the goods in the mar-
ket. Goods and services that are very similar or even substitutable should e treated
accordingly. The solution to this problem may lie in defining goods carefully in an ob.ject-
oriented fashion so that their inter-relationships are manifest. Doyle[12] suggests that a
language for the specification of market agents, including the goods themselves, would
be a very valuable step in making market-based programming more practical. That sug-
gestion is certainly born out by my research, though I have not investigated design issues
for such a language.
For sufficiently complicated systems it may be very cumbersome or perhaps even
imnpossible to accurately define the inputs and outputs of every process. However, for a
w ide range of tasks, these definitions should be obvious (lirectly from the design of the
indlividual procedures.
7.4.2 Time Estimates
Timne estimates for use of computational resources are also necessary to ensure an effi-
cient allocation. Without time information it will be impossible to distinguish between
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procedures that perform identical services in vastly different amounts of time. Since ra-
tional use of time is a principal goal of market-based allocation, there is no possibility of
avoiding this constraint.
Unfortunately, it may be very difficult to offer accurate time estimates for processes.
Since in general it is impossible to even determine if a process terminates in a finite
amount of time, there may be many domains where precise time estimates are impossible.
Of course, time estimate calculations are allowed to be complicated and can take into
account many factors of the current state of the computer, but in general it will be
impossible to know the exact execution time without actually executing the procedure.
If the time required to compute a time estimate is not negligible compared to the actual
time of execution, then the processor may be spending its time inefficiently.
For simple procedures, reasonable time estimates can be achieved from a combination
of analysis and experimentation. For the RECON system, time estimate formulas are
very simple and( ten(l to stay within ablout 20%,, of the actual execution time. Whether
the estimates are "accurate" is largely a matter of opinion.
However, it appears that very accurate time estimates are not especially critical, at
least in the simple domain of the RECON system. Small time estimate mistakes lead
to equally small (or sometimes no) misallocations. Inaccuracy of time estimates is a
form of uncertainty or incomplete information. Experience in real world markets, which
exhiblit great uncertainty, shows that good approximations to ideal allocations can still
be achieved by markets. In fact, when uncertainty is taken as given, markets (with some
restrictions) achieve the best possible allocation from the information available.
In addition, it may be possible for certain learning algorithms to be employed to
improve the quality of time estimates based on experience in running the processes. This
application of learning algorithms would be an area for significant further research.
There also may be some concern that time estimates be systematically inaccurate,
since a process claiming vastly optimistic execution times will get control of the processor
more often. However, this b)ehavior will very quickly be discouraged by the market,
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since processes which consistently under-estimate execution time will take large monetary
losses. Processes may also over-estimate execution time, resulting in increased profits.
]However, this is a perfectly legitimate strategy that represents a conservative approach
to risk taking. Analysis of how to assess and react to risk and then adjust time estimates
accordingly is another area requiring significant further research.
7.4.3 Atomization
For use within a market allocation system, there are some advantages to requiring that
computations be broken into the smallest possible blocks, or "atomized." In particular,
atoimization means that any intermediate values that are calculated in series should be
consideredi as separate processes. As a result, individual procedures produces all of their
relevant results at the end of execution. The constraint is more difficult to follow with
services, since it may not be clear how to break a service into atomic blocks. Atomization
is not required to use a market system, but it prevents certain cases in which computations
are performed inefficiently. To underscore this point, consider the following example
processes:
Suppose that in order to compute d(, however, the values of a, b, and c must be known.
So process 4 also computes the values of a, b, and c, in 2, 3, and 2 seconds respectively,
then computes d in 3 seconds.
If the system desires to calculate (d (i.e. the good "value of d" has a relatively high
price), then its only choice will be to execute process 4, requiring 10 seconds. Ideally,
howvever, we would like to use the methods of processes 1 though 3 to calculate a, b, and
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Process # Value Computed Seconds Used
1 a 1
2 -b 2
3 c 1
4 (1d 10
c in a total of 4 seconds, then use the method of process 4 to calculate d for a grand total
of 7 secondls.
Requiring atomization will correct the misallocations of the above example. When
process 4 is atomized it will be broken into 4 new procedures (named 4a, 41), 4c, and 4d
for easy reference). The goods for the values of a, b, and c are now inputs to 4d. As a
result, calculating those values becomes valuable in the market.
When process 1 and process 4a enter bids to calculate a, process 1 will always bid
higher since the inputs (none) and outputs (a) are identical, but process 1 requires less
time. Similarly, process 2 will beat out 41) andl process 3 will beat out 4c. Thus, the
market can ensure that d is calculated by the most efficient possible means.
There is one strong caution regarding atomization, however. If the time to run the
market and( determine the next allocation is significant relative to the running time of
the processes, then it may make sense to perform several related tasks as one "process."
This avoid using time inefficiently to decide what to do next. Suppose that for the
system described in this section the market is evaluated on the same processor and
requires 2 seconds. In this case the sequence market, process 1, market, process 2, market,
process 3, market, process 4d will require 15 seconds, while the sequence market, process
4 would require only 12 second(s to achieve the same result. This will all be hand(led(
correctly, however, if the time estimates are made to include the market evaluation time
as suggested in chapter 6. In this case both the atomize versions of process 4 and
thle original process 4 should be present. Since the time estimates now include market
processing time, the market will automatically select the fastest route to calculating d.
7.5 Communication and Scalability
In the modern United States economy, information is a major good which is often more
expensive than manufactured goods or services. In large-scale markets containing enor-
mous numbers of agents it is very often difficult, impractical, or impossible to provide
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all agents access to all information. As a result agents are often arranged hierarchically,
anl(l often agents exist whose sole function is to acquire and distribute information. Pre-
sumabll, a computational market will also encounter these issues when the number of
agents becomes very large.
One of the principal issues involved in handling this problem is determining the means
of communication between agents. The Contract Net ([2], also summarized in section 3.1)
provides one possible method of communication, specification, an(l acquiring information.
The Contract Net allows for very flexible communication, and offers a means of sul)con-
tracting, which may be critical when using decentralized agents in a loosely cooperative
manner. However, these mechanisms are somewhat complicated and place additional
requirements onto the programmer of the agents involved.
This should not, however, be consi(lered a deficiency in the Contract Net protocol.
Rather, it shows that increased exchange of information comes at a price. The RECON
system as it now stands offers no direct communication between processes. This is much
easier to implement and the design of individual procedures is not much more difficult
than in any other programming environment. However, the RECON system is on a very
small scale where it is reasonable to have all of the agents have direct access to whatever
information they may nee(l to enter bids and perform tasks.
In light of these tradeoffs, the level of communication between processes and the
availability of information in general are significant issues in the design of any practical
system which is based on market allocations. Extensive continuing research will be
necessary to establish guidelines for agent interactions other than simple entering of bids
andl use of resources.
In addition, when there are very large numbers of agents participating in tile economy,
it may not be practical for every agent to be dlirectly involved in the market. In real world
stock markets, for example, specialized "traders" are usually the only direct participants
in the auctions (using WVALRAS terminology) for stocks. The traders themselves are
not bidding for stock ownership, but are each representing many in(livi(luals who wish
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to execute trades. In(leed, the very existence of stock markets represents an extension to
the blasic market mechanisms I have explored in my research.
Thus we see another form of communication which may be required in large systems,
as well as the need for hierarchical structure mentioned at the beginning of this section.
In. the particular example of traders, it appears that much of their information gathering
(from potential ibuyers and sellers) should be performed in parallel, since the tra(ters can
all communicate with clients simultaneously with only minimal need for communication
l)etweenl trad(ers. ((O)f course, traders may still need inter-communication when partic-
ipating in the auctions.) As the number of agents becomes larger there may be more
opportunities for optimization through parallelization.
O(thers types of information may be valuable as well. An agent which determined the
qualities of other agents was mentioned in section 4.3.1, and( this concept can be exten(le(l
to arbitrary informnation-getters. This information will then be trade(l just like any other
good in the computational market. It will generally be up to the programmer, however,
to assess the need for information gatherers and to implement them individually, as well
as to design consumers that value information and agents that can put information to
use. None of these tasks seem trivial.
Unfortunately, then, scaling a market-based system to include more and more agents
may not be as simple as programming more consumers, more producers, and more good
specifications. Significant scaling may require significant extensions to the computation
market described in this thesis and implemented in my research. The practicalit of
markets on a large scale is suggested by the success of enormous national economies,
though it remains to be proven for computational markets. Indeed, as the nations have
imove(l to being participants in a "world economy" in recent years, the problems of scaling
even well-established economic systems have occasionally been manifested.
7.6 Additional Issues in Economics
Economists have studie(l market systems in great detail. In this section I present a
few important considerations from applied economics that I have largely ignored in the
rel]atively simply RECON domain. However, these issues will become more and more
likely to play a significant role as the market-based approach is brought to other domains
and scaled to larger systems.
7.6.1 Regulation
The regulation of real word markets is normally based on a system of rules, a group of
agents which detect and/or judge rule violations, and prescribed penalties for violating
these rules. This may be one area where computational markets have a significant advan-
tage over their real-world counterparts. As mentioned in earlier chapters, regulations in a
computational economy can be mad(e to be more like physical laws which are impossible
to) violate. This prevents the need for enforcer agents andl penalties.
However, it is still non-trivial to determine what the regulations should be in a compu-
tational market. The current R.EC()N implementation, for example, does not allow inter-
ruption of any kind because of the possible losses associated (see sections 7.3 and 5.5.2).
However, many systems would want to allow interruptions to deal with events beyond the
control of the computer itself. Parallel architectures might allow interruptions regularly
since results on one processor might make other computations mnuch more valuable than
an ongoing computation on another processor.
In a highly evolved computational market, it might be (lesirable to regulate against
monopolies, provide detailed mechanisms for bankruptcy, or disallow the trading of cer-
tain kinds of options. As tile market becomes increasingly complicated, there may be a
nieed for many of the regulations imposed in tile real world. Hopefully experience and ex-
perimnentation in real-world markets can yield suggestions when a computational market
appears to need regulation. Of course, it mnay also be ifficult to tell when regulations
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are needed.
In a decentralized system in which many humans are designing agents, and some or
all of them (the humans) are interested in only their own goals, it may be possible that
agents come into existence that violate regulations. In this case there can be a need for
enforcers, judges, and prescribed punishments. Even here, however, "fairness" will only
lbe important when violations result in inefficient allocations.
As an example of a potential need for regulation, consider "dishonest" agents which
use resources but do not have the funding (or the willingness) to pay for them. Since this
kind of "theft" will typically result in inefficient allocations, it is desirable to prevent it.
Two) obvious solutions are to enforce a significant penalty (such as (deletion - remember
tlhat there is no concern about cruelty here) against any agent which does not pay debts,
or to require advanced payments for any rented resources and deduct the rent from the
retainer. There may also be other possible ways of regulating against resource theft.
This simple example shows that regulation of large-scale computational markets may
ble a very complicated issue, and one that (much like real-world markets) will require
ongoing research in the future.
7.6.2 Macroeconomic considerations
In addition to the properties of the individual markets, trades, and equilibria that ensure
efficient allocations, a long-running economic system will exhibit behaviors that are best
examined at a global level. Macroeconomics is a well-established branch of economics
whlich deals with exactly these global issues, including inflation, interest rates, savings
and investments, central banks, the supply and meaning of currency, and many others.
It appears to 'be safe to ignore macroeconomic considerations (as I have (lone) in small
systems with simple agents, but it also seems very likely that these considerations should
not be ignored in the development of more evolved computational markets. Especially
when the agents become more sophisticated, it is possible that reaction to macroeconomic
forces will be possible. For example, if currency is (devaluing over time (inflation), then
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this should bIe considered in making rational bids, since the longer the process waits the
less it will be able to buy with its money. On the other hand, when there is deflation,
there may be incentives to hold capital and then spen(l it when it has more purchasing
power in the future.
[In tile simple RECON implementation, the money supply is not intentionally regu-
lated, but does change significantly because new consumers enter the market andl )ring
along their endowments. As a result, even this domain exhibits macroeconomic fluc-
tuations, especially inflation since the money supply will normally increase over time.
FIowrever, agents are not programmed to react to inflationary trends but rather to opti-
mize their utility/profit at each stage without consideration to the past or future.
Macroeconomics offers a wealth of theory that can b)e brought to b)ear against these
issues, and also can suggest rational strategies for agents to respond to these global
changes. To date, however, macroeconomics has been almost completely ignored in the
study of applying economics to computer science.
7.6.3 Externalities
Because processes typically affect the "world" in more ways than simply producing out-
puts, there may be some side effects whose value is very difficult to account for. These
side effects are called externalities in economics, and are common in real-world markets.
Externalities are usually partitioned into negative externalities, meaning that a side effect
has a net negative effect on other agents in the economy, and positive externalities, with
the symmetric meaning.
Example from ordinary markets of negative externalities include pollution from pro-
d-uction, large ugly signs out front of a store, and poorly-maintained houses in a neigh-
borhoo(l. All of these affect not only themselves but other agents in the economy who
typlically have no control over the offending agent. Positive externalities might arise from
teaching, invention, or exceptionally well-maintained houses in a neighborhood. In each
case outside agents are affected positively in a way that they have not completely paid
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for.
Externalities generally cause significant difficulty in market systems, since it may be
very har(l to assign value (or penalty) to them appropriately. To provide ideal incentives
and resource allocation, the person who maintains a house extremely well should actually
be paid by his neighbors, since they are direct beneficiaries. The issue of handling
externalities in general is a significant area of ongoing research in economics, and will also
have to be researched within the computational market domain. In this section I (ldo not
provide te he ansers, but suggest places where externalities may arise in computational
markets, along with some general ideas for handling them rationally.
7.6.3.1 Positive Externalities
The most obvious class of positive externalities in a computational market are those
procedures whose executions allows other procedures to run faster in the future. Many
common processes such as garbage collection and defragmentation of disk space can have
such an effect. Each of these processes allows faster accesses in the future, thereby
accelerating future computations. Another example with a similar effect is a process
which tabulates a function. Then any process that needs values of that function in the
fiuture can simply look them up rather than recalculating them.
Each of these processes may become valuable in itself if consumers value its execution.
However, it is not. obvious how to account for the total benefits of procedures with positive
externalities, especially since tile benefits of their execution may be reaped repeatedly
and indefinitelv into the future. One reasonable possibility is to require a sort of charge-
per-use system which is a simplified version of a patent or royalties. Thus, for example,
each time a process used a tabulated function it would pay the process which originally
tabulate(l it. This may help to provide proper incentives for tabulation, though it is
still difficult to guess the value accurately, since future uses cannot b)e fully anticipated.
Unfortunately, this scheme has a significant drawback. When an agent is forced to
make the choice between paying for the fast, tabulated function and paying for the
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extra computation time to recalculate the value, it may sometimes be more profitable
to recalculate. However, since the function has already been tabulated, it is inefficient to
ever recalculate values.
7.6.3.2 Negative Externalities
Although computational markets can be built in such a way as to make many negative
externalities be impossible, there are still cases where the execution of a process will
somehow have a negative impact on other processes. One obvious case is that of disk
fragmentation, mentioned in the discussion of positive externalities. When a process
performs alternate writing and (deleting operations on a disk, the file system may become
heavily fragmented with various pointers telling where to look for the next part of the
file. In general, this fragmentation will slow d(ownI disk accesses, and therefore have a
negative affect on any process which performs a read operation in the future.
One possible method of handling negative externalities within the market framework
is to require that processes somehow pay for any negative effects that they may have.
This establishes an appropriate disincentive for negative externalities. These "fines" can
then be directed to paying processes that perform services to correct the problems, when
that is possible. In the example at hand, processes would be charged for each delete
or write operation that caused fragmentation and that money would be used( to bid for
the service of defi'agmentation. When "blame" is easy to assign an(l processes exist that
have positive externalities canceling out the negative externalities, this sort of earmarked
fining protocol seems appropriate. However, a formula still needs to be developed to
dletermine the magnitude of fines.
7.6.4 Complementarity
In many markets there may be goods whose functionality is somehow tied together. These
complementary goods, as they are called in economics, typically rely on each other in
orler to be usefuil. Real world markets are filled with such goods: tennis rackets and
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tennis balls; cameras andl film; fishing rods, reels, line, an(l hooks. A fishing rod is not
verv useful without its complements, at least if the intent is to catch fish. If fishing
line suddenly became prohibitively expensive, then the demand for fishing rods would
presumablly fall, since they are not worth much by themselves.
This is often given as the defining characteristic of complementarity, specifically that
price increases in one good actually result in a drop in demand for the good's comple-
nments. This is slightly counterintuitive for the kinds of markets discussed in this thesis.
Normally, we are interested in trade-offs, which mean that when a good is very expensive,
other goods can be substituted. Goods for which price increases in one cause demand
increases in the other are called substitutable, which seems to be the common case in
simple computational markets.
lJnfortunately, complementarities can cause significant problems to the system. In
particular, the iterative convergence methods used by NWALRAS to calculate equilibrium
prices are not guarantee(l to converge in the case of complementarities. It remains to be
seen if computationally tractable methods can ble (levelopedl that solve markets that are
not restricted in this way.
In light of this, it is important to determine if complementarities are likely to exist in
a computational market. Unfortunately, there are several simple cases where complemen-
tairities seem likely to arise. One specific case is the relationship between memory and
processor time. To a certain extent these goods are substitutable, since tradeoffs can be
ma(le between algorithms that are space-intensive but time-efficient and those that are
tine-intensive but space-efficient. However, there is also a complementarity that exists at
extreme prices. If memory becomes extremely expensive, then demand for processor time
will decrease, since most processes will not be able to do anything useful with processor
time ut no meniorv.
There is also a more general class of complementarities that can arise from comple-
mnents in inputs. Suppose for example that a process requires two values, xr and y, and
produces a value z. Further suppose that :r is a common input requirement, lbut that
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, is only needed to calculate z, though this is not absolutely necessary to exhibit com-
pleinentarity. If many other processes bid up the value of calculating x because it is a
commonly needed input, then the demand for y may actually fall, since is not valuable
if x is too expensive to make calculating z be worthwhile.
Whenever inputs take the form of a conjunctive expression, it is at least conceivable
that complementarities can result. It remains to be seen how significant of a problem
this actually is in practice and if small patches can be used to correct for occasional
complementarities.
7.7 Extension to Parallel Processing Environments
Al]though parallel processing environments are bound to carry many implementation
complications, the extension of processor markets to this domain is straightforward at a
theoretical level. The auction mechanism remains nearly identical to that of section 5.5.2
and( section 6.2, with the only extension being that the supply is altered from one proces-
sor to however many identical processors are available. If the processors are differentiable,
then each type should be treated as a separate goods with its own auction.
The bidding side requires only two simple extensions, namely that bids be given
on a per unit time per processor basis and that demand "curves" indicate the number
of processors that a particular agent needs to use to perform its computation. These
extensions are nearly identical to those proposed in section 7.2 for a market in memory
space. Specifically the maximum bid rate formula for processor time in the parallel
computation environment becomes:
value of outputs and services - value of all other inputs
nax ilmurn rate = (estimated execution time) (estimated processors required)
As usual, the demand curve will be zero for all prices above the maximum bid rate,
and equal to the number of processors needed for any price below the maximum bid rate.
There is also the possibility that a process can use a variable number of processors to
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Figure 7-1: Demand Curve for a Process with Three Ways of Using Processors.
perform its computation. In this case it will presumably be faster to use more processors
than fewer. The resulting dlemandl curve will be a staircase that changes height at each
of the zero-profit points. Specifically, there will be a maximum bidl rate for each possible
numlber of processors that the process could use. To clarify this concept, suppose that
a particular process has an expected profit (the numerator in the maximum bid rate
formula) of $144. It has three different ways of using processors that result in the following
expected execution times: 4 processors for 4 seconds, 2 processors for 6 seconds, or 1
processor for 9 seconds. Using the formula above, we see that it will be willing to use
4 processors when the price (per unit time per processor) is less than $9 (from j14), 2
processors when the price is less than $12, and and 1 processor when the price is less
than $16. The resulting demand curve is shown in figure 7-1.
Given these extensions, the market discovers the equilibrium prices by the usual
methlod: it aggregates the demand from all biddlling processes and finds the intersection
of the aggregate demand with the aggregate supply (the supply is simply a horizontal line
at the level of the number of processors available). The resulting equilibrium indicates
the price of processor time, and all processes which are willing to compute at that price
can be awarded( the number of processors they have demandedl.
O)ne difficulty in parallel architectures is that there may be a great deal of asynchronic-
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Figure 7-2: Processor Market with No Equilibrium.
ity in the use of processors. It will certainly not normally be the case that all processors
are rented and freed at exactly the same times. From the point of view of market design,
this is no problem - the aggregate supply curve will simply represent the number of
processes available in the particular auction. The prob)lem is that agents may need a
certain minimum number of processors in order to operate. When that number is greater
than the number available, the equilibria may not make very much sense. Imagine that
there is only one process bidlling and it requires 3 processors, but only 2 are available.
The aggregate d(em andl-aggregate supply diagram of figure 7-2 results.
Because of the discontinuity in demand, there is no equilibrium value - the two
curves (do not intersect. This makes sense intuitively, since the process cannot get what
it wants (3 processors) and the supplier cannot sell what it has (2 processors). Most
likely the logical action in the case of no equilibrium is to do nothing. Then when
more processors become available an equilibrium will result and the market will properly
allocate resources. In a practical implementation, failure to find an equilibrium should
prolably be interpreted as though none existed, though this might not necessarily be the
case.
In addition, this methodology generally favors processes which can use a smaller
amo-unt of processors, since they can keep b)uying up small quantities out from under
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the processes which are waiting around for a larger number to be free. Thus processes
requiring large Ilumbers of processors may have to pay to rent processors that are not
actually being use(l so as to eventually acquire enough processors to perform the desired
computation. Therefore the remedy to this problem will be to bid on however many
processors are available using a time estimate which includes the waiting time for enough
other processors to become free. Since every running process has entered a time estimate
itself, reasonably accurate information may be available to use in making these estimates.
This method will ensure efficient allocation since it always ensures that the processors
are used for maximum expected future l)enefit, even when that may require a processor
sitting i(lle.
Finally, there is the possibility of d(ifferentiated( processors. However, this should not
cause any confusion, at least at a theoretical level. A process may bid on any processor
that; is capable of performing the required tasks. The maximum bid rate will be calculated
separately for each processor using specialized time estimates. Thus a process will always
lie willing to bid more for a processor that can perform its task faster. As usual, the
resultant demanll for each good will be a function of other goods' prices as well, namely
the prices of the other processors. The final demand function represents a deman(l for
only the most desirable processor whose price is below the maximum bid rate for that
processor. The market equilibrium will automatically serve as a match-maker. Each
processor will be allocated in an efficient manner, maximizing the benefit from its use.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
As the complexity of computational environments increases, the utility of decentralized
allocation mechanisms will become evident. This thesis combined research in economics,
dlecision theory, and( computer science to provide a market-based means of allocating the
processor, and suggested ways to allocate similar resources. These bidding and auction
mechanisms are a fundamental step in developing market-based( environments.
The processor auction mechanism detailed in section 5.5.2 satisfies virtually all of the
goals for a computation market outlined in section 4.3, with the possible exception of
rapid execution, though this failure should be easily overcome by software optimization
an(l/or specialized hardware. The processor rental market allows for efficient allocation
of time with respect to other resources, goods, and services, and provi(les an implicit
"rational" decision, in the sense of limited rationality of the meta-greedy assumption
[24]. The method( of taking bids an(l using them to determine prices is very simple.
The combination of the reasoning economy with the processor market allows for rapid
diynamic ad(justment without necessarily requiring explicit replanning.
The mechanisms provided are relatively straightforward to implement and can be
programmed( in a computationally tractable manner. Although this research is only the
very beginning of the development of practical market-based resource allocation systems
for computation. I am hopeful that I have laid some of the groundwork for further
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research. The advantages of markets and the extent of economic research and experience
point to the eventual goal that large-scale market-based allocation systems some dlay be
a part of practical computation environments.
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